Is Nuclear Deterrence Paradoxical?

Dialogue 23 (2):187-198 (1984)
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Abstract

A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. In his “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” Gregory Kavka argues that such moral paradoxes lurk in the concept of deterrence and further that the present world situation of mutual nuclear deterrence may well provide a concrete illustration of these paradoxes. That deterrence can involve paradox may well be true, but what I wish to consider here is whether the case of nuclear deterrence is in fact an instance of “paradoxical deterrence”.

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William Seager
University of Toronto at Scarborough

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References found in this work

Some paradoxes of deterrence.Gregory S. Kavka - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (6):285-302.
Deterrence, utility, and rational choice.Gregory S. Kavka - 1980 - Theory and Decision 12 (1):41-60.
In defence of deterrence.Arthur Hockaday - 1982 - In Geoffrey L. Goodwin (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. St. Martin's Press.

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