Abstract

We offer a reading of some passages from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in which, dealing with the symbolic constructions of arithmetic, Wittgenstein puts in motion the most outstanding features of Leibniz’s concept of Symbolic Knowledge: the computational and the “ecthetic” functions of the notion of Symbolic Blind Though. We begin with a brief presentation of some conceptual distinctions proposed by Oscar Miguel Esquisabel in his investigation about the Leibnizian origin of the tradition of Symbolic Knowledge. We then contrast these topics with the way Pasquale Frascolla interprets those same Tractarian passages, emphasizing the way in which he suspends any relevant sense in which we could speak about formal knowledge in Wittgenstein’s opera. To make our criticism better suited, our projection of Leibnizian lights into the Tractatus and into Frascolla’s interpretation of it is assisted with a concise exposition of one historical development in the Leibnizian tradition. Grounded in a study in which Javier Legris retraces the features of Symbolic Blind Though in Frege’s works, we then conclude proposing the advantages of our approach.