Leibniz: Philosophy of Mind

A continuidade e a ruptura entre homens e animais apontam para um impasse interno da filosofia de Leibniz. Por um lado, ele deve poder dar conta da emergência do que é propriamente humano a partir da animalidade obedecendo ao Princípio de Continuidade ; por outro lado, a racionalidade introduz uma diferença qualitativa que não parece poder ser redutível a uma mera distinção de graus. Sem procurar eliminar essa tensão conceitual, o artigo trata de entender suas consequências para o projeto filosófico (...) de Leibniz e da Modernidade como um todo. (shrink)

Leibniz repeatedly states that there is a very close connection between reflection and rationality. In his view, reflective acts somehow lead to self-consciousness, reason, the knowledge of necessary truths, and even to the moral liability of the respective substances. Whereas it might be relatively easy to see how reflective acts lead to self-consciousness, it is much harder to understand how they are connected to rationality. Why should a substance which is able to produce reflective acts therefore be rational? How can (...) the having of reflective acts be responsible for the substance’s ability to reason correctly and to acquire knowledge of necessary and eternal truths? The aim of my paper is to understand better the required mechanisms and to make thus conceivable Leibniz’s bold claim that reflective acts lead to rationality. In order to accomplish this, I will proceed in three steps. First, I will specify what kind of self-consciousness is, according to Leibniz, produced by reflective acts. A substance must recognize itself as a unitary substance bearing perceptions. Second, I will argue that this type of self- consciousness can be seen as the basis for the ability to form judgments. This is possible because the subject-predicate structure of judgments is mirrored by the ontology of substances and their modifications. Third, I will point out that, together with the idea of identity (which we also acquire by reflection), the combination of judgments allows us to make inferences. This ability, in turn, is sufficient for rationality. Thus, I can explain how reflective acts and rationality are connected with each other. (shrink)

The Molyneux problem is one of the major questions addressed by early modern authors. Whereas Locke’s response to Molyneux’s question has been the subject of extensive scholarly discussion, Leibniz’s response has received comparatively little attention. This paper defends an interpretation of Leibniz’s nuanced response to the problem and criticizes a competing interpretation that has recently been proposed.

In his defense of innateness in New Essays on Human Understanding (1704), Leibniz attributes innateness to concepts and principles which do not originate from the senses rather than to the ideas that we are born with. He argues that the innate concepts and principles can be known in two ways: through reason or natural light (necessary truths), and through instincts (other innate truths and principles). In this paper I will show how theoretical and moral reasoning differ from each other in (...) Leibniz, and compare moral reasoning and instincts as sources of knowledge in his practical philosophy. As the practical instincts are closely related to pleasure and passions, which are by nature cognitive, my emphasis will be on the affective character of instinctive moral action and especially deliberation which leads to moral action. I will argue that inclinations arising from moral instinct, which lead us to pleasure while avoiding sorrow, can direct our moral action and sometimes anticipate reasoning when conclusions are not readily available. Acting by will, which is related to moral reasoning, and acting by instincts can lead us to the same moral knowledge independently, but they can also complement each other. To illustrate the two alternative ways to reach moral knowledge, I will discuss the case of happiness, which is the goal of all human moral action for Leibniz. (shrink)

We offer a reading of some passages from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in which, dealing with the symbolic constructions of arithmetic, Wittgenstein puts in motion the most outstanding features of Leibniz’s concept of Symbolic Knowledge: the computational and the “ecthetic” functions of the notion of Symbolic Blind Though. We begin with a brief presentation of some conceptual distinctions proposed by Oscar Miguel Esquisabel in his investigation about the Leibnizian origin of the tradition of Symbolic Knowledge. We then contrast these topics with (...) the way Pasquale Frascolla interprets those same Tractarian passages, emphasizing the way in which he suspends any relevant sense in which we could speak about formal knowledge in Wittgenstein’s opera. To make our criticism better suited, our projection of Leibnizian lights into the Tractatus and into Frascolla’s interpretation of it is assisted with a concise exposition of one historical development in the Leibnizian tradition. Grounded in a study in which Javier Legris retraces the features of Symbolic Blind Though in Frege’s works, we then conclude proposing the advantages of our approach. (shrink)

"We are omniscient but confused," says Leibniz. He also says that we live in the best of all possible worlds, yet do not causally interact. So what are we? Leibniz is known for many things, including the ideality of space and time, calculus, plans for a universal language, theodicy, and ecumenism. But he is not known for his ideas on the self and personal identity. This book shows that Leibniz offers an original, internally coherent theory of personal identity, a theory (...) that stands on its own even next to Locke's contemporaneous and more famous version. This book will appeal not only to students of Leibniz's thought but also to philosophers and psychologists interested in methodological problems in understanding or formulating theories of self and personal identity. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v59-de-mendonca.

Aunque no es posible ofrecer aquí un análisis detallado de las diferentes cues tionesimplicadas en la teoría de las representaciones en la Modernidad, sí pode mos atender auno de sus aspectos más relevantes, presente en la exposición de Leibniz, Wolff,Baumgarten y Kant, a saber: el reconocimiento progresivo y la vin dicación de unconocimiento específicamente sensible como un tipo específico de conocimiento en lafilosofía escolar alemana del siglo XVIII. A pesar de que Leibniz atribuye al conocimiento claro y confuso el grado (...) más bajo en su esquema de los niveles del conocimiento, tambiénes cierto que su exposición apunta ya a la irre ductibilidad de este ámbito en unconocimiento finito como el humano. Por lo demás, lo confuso aquí adquiere sentido en elsistema del saber en la medida en que Leibniz considera que todos los conocimientos obre cuestiones de hecho, si bien falibles, se encuentran en conexión con la verdad en lamedida en que parti cipan de la misma, al expresar el fundamento último de lo real y sersusceptibles de perfectibilidad en el seno de una subjetividad dinámica que comienza aser entendida como unidad vital. En Wolff y Baumgarten se profundiza en la vía que esabierta ya por Leibniz: la exposición de los niveles de conocimiento en el marco de unaimbricación de la lógica de la representación con una psicología vitalista, en la que sereconocerá la experiencia del sentimiento como expresión subjetiva de la perfectibilidaddel conocimiento humano. Aunque la filosofía de Kant supondrá una ruptura con laexposición escolar de esta teoría de los niveles de conocimiento o los tipos derepresentación, lo cierto es que el nacimiento de su teoría de la sensi bilidad tiene lugar enel marco histórico de esta concepción tradicional. (shrink)

In his famous monadological metaphysics, Leibniz distinguishes between simple monads, animal monads, and rational monads or minds. This tripartite metaphysical distinction is mirrored by his discrimination between cognitive performances these three types of monads are capable of. Simple monads perceive; animal monads additionally remember, sense, and mimic reasoning by associating mental images; rational monads, furthermore, think, reflect on and know themselves, know eternal truths, and reason logically. This essay will focus on Leibniz's account of the cognitive performances of minds and (...) their relationship to those of animal monads. After Leibniz's notion of perception is introduced in section three, in section four the essay turns to his conception of sensation in animal monads. The following sections five to seven address the mental performances typical of minds and present Leibniz's conceptions of ideas, concepts, thoughts, apperception, sensation in rational monads, and conscientia. While at the beginning of the essay Leibniz's views get situated in the context of early modern philosophy of mind, especially as it relates to Descartes and the Aristotelian tradition, the essay concludes with a summary of the main innovations we find in his conception of cognition. (shrink)

Leibniz’s correspondence with Antoine Arnauld is one of the clearest and most comprehensive expressions of Leibniz’s philosophy in the so-called middle period. This chapter will explore the philosophical content of this correspondence. It will concentrate on four of the most central topics: (a) complete concepts and contingency, (b) substance and body, (c) causation, and (d) the special status of rational souls in God’s plan.

My aim in this chapter is to explain how and why all human cognition depends on the body for Leibniz. I will show that there are three types of dependence: (a) the body is needed in order to supply materials, or content, for thinking; (b) the body is needed in order to give us the opportunity for the discovery of innate ideas; and (c) the body is needed in order to provide sensory notions as vehicles of thought. The third type (...) is intimately connected to the faculty of the imagination, which supplies the sensory vehicles of thought. Hence, the paper will also examine Leibniz’s account of that faculty and its operations. Before doing any of this, however, I will address the elephant in the room: Leibniz’s claim that mind and body do not interact at all, metaphysically speaking. The correspondence between mind and body is merely a matter of what he calls ‘pre-established harmony’. At first glance, this Leibnizian doctrine may suggest a radical disembodiment of all human cognition. Yet, I will argue that this is not the case and that, quite to the contrary, pre-established harmony requires that cognition is embodied in one important sense. (shrink)

Leibniz sometimes tells us that there are only two fundamental types of mental states: perceptions and appetitions, that is, mental representations and desire-like states. While this may sound like an overly sparse ontology of mental states, the philosophy of mind that Leibniz builds from these elements is surprisingly nuanced and powerful. What makes this possible is that he distinguishes different sub-types of these mental states. Leibniz famously differentiates between unconscious and conscious perceptions, which gives him an advantage over philosophers like (...) Descartes, for whom all perceptions are conscious. He also distinguishes between reflective and unreflective perceptions, as well as between degrees of perceptual distinctness. Leibniz furthermore follows scholastic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas in distinguishing different types of appetitions. Uncovering what those are and what roles they play in Leibniz’s philosophy of mind are the central aims of this chapter. (shrink)

The mature Leibniz often describes monads as having two types of modifications: perceptions and appetites. But why would monads need appetites? When reading secondary literature about Leibniz, it can easily look as if appetites are superfluous: some scholars describe the inner workings of monads without saying much, if anything, about appetites. Instead, they focus on perceptions and explain the transition to new perceptions by reference to prior perceptions together with the underlying primitive force or law of the series. These interpretations (...) appear to be doing just fine without invoking appetites. And, in fact, there are texts in which Leibniz himself neglects appetites almost completely. Some passages suggest that perceptions cause other perceptions, and other texts indicate that the monads themselves cause perceptions directly. If that is the case, it is not clear what purpose appetites serve; they do not appear to be needed for explaining monadic change. One possible response to the question why monads need appetites is the following. Appetites, according to Leibniz, are monadic tendencies to transition to new perceptions. Perhaps without such tendencies, no change would occur in a monad. On this interpretation, a full explanation of monadic change needs to invoke tendencies, and those in turn are (or include) appetites. I think that this response is partially correct, as I will argue later. Yet, it does not fully explain the function of appetites. How precisely are appetites (viewed as tendencies) supposed to figure into the explanation—do they function as causes of change, and if so, what kinds of causes? Are they efficient, final, or formal causes, or perhaps causes of yet another type? Or might they figure into the explanation in some non-causal way? This paper explores possible answers to the question what role appetites play in the lives of monads. There is not enough time to discuss these answers in much detail or exhaust the logical space, but I will briefly consider the options that strike me as the most promising contenders. These options are: (1) appetites are superfluous; there is no sense in which they explain or cause monadic change; (2) appetites are formal causes; (3) appetites are final causes; (4) appetites are efficient causes; (5) appetites are ultimately the same as perceptions (or aspects of perceptions), and perceptions in turn cause or explain monadic change; and (6) appetites are not causally involved in monadic change, but they are explanatory in a loose, derivative sense. I will argue for a version of the last option. The resulting picture of monadic change is admittedly radical and strange but there are excellent reasons to embrace it. (shrink)

This book is a systematic reappraisal of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. The main argument of this book is easy to state: Leibniz offers a fully natural theory of mind. In today’s philosophical climate, in which much effort has been put into discovering a naturalized theory of mind, Leibniz’s efforts to reach a similar goal 300 years earlier will provide a critical stance from which we can assess our own theories. But while the goals might be similar, the content of Leibniz’s (...) theory significantly diverges from the majority of today’s theories. Leibniz’s philosophy of mind meets the standards of what he would regard as a fully natural theory. Perhaps surprisingly, Leibniz’s theological commitments yield a thoroughgoing naturalizing methodology: the properties of an object are explicable in term of the object’s nature. This book argues that Leibniz pursued his philosophy of mind with this methodology in hand. If we keep this commitment to a naturalizing project in mind, then we will find in Leibniz a rich and interesting philosophy of mind. -/- This book provides an account of Leibniz’s naturalizing constraints and traces them through Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. It covers issues relating to mental representation, perception, sensation, consciousness, memory, and moral identity. (shrink)

Leibniz explains both activity and sensation in terms of the relative distinctness of perception. This paper argues that the systematic connection between activity and sensation is illuminated by Leibniz’s use of distinctness in analyzing each. Leibnizian sensation involves two levels of activity: on one level, the relative forcefulness of an expression enables certain expressions to stand out against the perceptual field, but in addition to this there is an activity of the mind that enables sensory experience. This connection of mental (...) activity and perceptual distinctness enables us to better appreciate the fundamental role perceptual distinctness plays in Leibniz’s theory of sensation. (shrink)

Wie ist es zu erklären, dass wir uns vermittels geistiger Akte auf Gegenstände beziehen können? Und wodurch sind uns geistige Akte bewusst? René Descartes und Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz geben faszinierende Antworten auf diese beiden zentralen Fragen der Philosophie des Geistes. In dieser Studie werden die Konzeptionen beider Autoren im Detail analysiert, miteinander verglichen und mit heutigen Positionen in Beziehung gesetzt. Die Analysen zeigen, dass Descartes eine deflationäre Konzeption des Bewusstseins (conscientia) vertritt. Bewusstsein ist „nur“ ein Aspekt der Intentionalität, die das (...) wesentliche Merkmal des cartesischen Geists ausmacht. Die Analysen zu Leibniz weisen nach, dass er im Vergleich zu Descartes eine weitaus komplexere und anspruchsvollere Konzeption des Geistes vertritt, die aus heutiger Sicht anschlussfähiger erscheint. Die herausragenden Merkmale seiner Position sind die strukturelle Auffassung der Intentionalität und die Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Formen von Bewusstsein (apperception und conscientia), die dem phänomenalen Bewusstsein und dem reflexiven Selbstbewusstsein entsprechen. Im Unterschied zu Descartes weist Leibniz auch nicht-rationalen Tieren Bewusstsein in Form der Apperzeption zu. Conscientia bleibt dagegen den rationalen Substanzen vorbehalten. (shrink)

What would Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz have said about today’s problem of consciousness? Some philosophers claim that Leibniz was one of the first to argue that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between our knowledge of matter and our knowledge of consciousness, and that he thought this posed a problem for materialism (see for example Churchland 1995: 191-2; Kriegel 2015: 49; Seager 1991; Searle 1983: 267-8). This is supposed to be the point of the famous passage in the Monadology (1714), in which (...) Leibniz argues that perception is ‘inexplicable in terms of mechanical reasons’... (shrink)

In philosophischen wie nichtphilosophischen Darstellungen wird heutzutage der Ursprung des Leib-Seele-Problems überwiegend mit dem kartesischen Dualismus in Verbindung gebracht. Es wird die Meinung vertreten, daß erst durch Descartes’ Aufteilung des Menschen (und damit der Welt) in die beiden einander ausschließenden Substanzen der res extensa und der res cogitans das philosophische Grundübel in die Leib-Seele-Philosophie gekommen sei.1 Folgerichtig ist man fest davon überzeugt, daß sich das Problem nur lösen läßt, wenn man es an der Wurzel packt und konsequent Descartes’ ontologischen Dualismus (...) verwirft. Ein Herumdoktern an den Symptomen nach Art des Okkasionalismus oder der Leibnizschen Lehre von der prästabilierten Harmonie wird demgegenüber als metaphysisch suspekt und aussichtslos angesehen. Zwar ist inzwischen die Hoffnung, durch bloßen Anti-Cartesianismus ans Ziel zu kommen, etwas geschwunden, nachdem man feststellen mußte, daß die anfänglich so vielversprechende Kritik des Behaviourismus an Descartes nicht zum Ziel führte. Und auch mit der nächsten, von der Identitätstheorie hervorgerufenen großen Welle der Descartes-Kritik sind die Lösungen bis heute nicht so befriedigend ausgefallen, wie man sie gerne hätte. Die Überzeugung ist aber weiterhin stark, daß eine Lösung für das Leib-Seele-Problem zuallererst die Verwerfung des kartesischen Dualismus erfordert. (shrink)

The main goal of this dissertation is to offer both an interpretation to the theory of singular representations as presented by Leibniz in his writings from the 1680’s, as well as a hypothesis of a criticism made by Kant to what we take to be the cornerstones of such a theory. These cornerstones consist in (i) the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (ii) the Doctrine of the Complete Notion of the Individual Substance (iii) the Intensional Definitions of the Truth Values. (...) Once the writings in which (ii) and (iii) are presented only began to be published in the XIX century, we argue in favor of the plausibility of such a hypothesis by means of logical arguments, which intend to show that Kant could have deduced (ii) and (iii) from Leibniz’ commitment to (i) as well as to the existence of a parfaite représentation of ordinary objects in the divine understanding, and historical arguments, which intend to show that Kant could have had access to both (ii) and (iii) and even ascribed these to Leibniz by means of Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre and Wolff’s Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica. We will add to these, also textual arguments in order to show that there is in Kant’s philosophy not only a critique to (i), but also to (ii) e (iii), as well as an interpretation of what this criticism consists in. (shrink)

If we consider their fundamental role in the makeup of simple substances, our understanding of Leibnizian appetites or ‘appetitions’ seems far from satisfactory. To promote a better understanding of Leibniz’s mature view of appetites, I present a new reading of the appetitive nature of simple substances, focusing on key texts where Leibniz stresses how appetites fail to reach what they strive for. Against the “standard reading,” according to which appetites are the direct causes of subsequent perceptual states, I propose an (...) alternative, more complex picture of appetitive activity within simple substances. On my account, what Leibniz typically refers to as ‘appetites’ do not directly cause subsequent states, but are strivings or desires to be in states of less unease or greater happiness, states that the creature might actually fail to enjoy. This reading of appetites, I argue, is consistent with there being an additional, distinct strand of appetitive activity, one that corresponds to the primitive forces of simple substances. In contrast to the first strand of appetitive activity, this second strand is directly causal in that its final causality is operative in the exceptionless occurrence of the series of perceptual states prescribed in the “law of the series.” The resulting picture is one in which simple substances are appetitive through and through, with teleological activity permeating the substance at the levels of both primitive and derivative forces. (shrink)

Leibniz seeks to establish the tenability of faith and reason in his moral philosophy through a tripod of thought, consisting of 1) fundamental human goodness; 2) human error in judgment; and 3) that God is just. A difficulty arises concerning how God can justly punish human beings if they always will what is Good. By considering akrasia, which occurs when error is committed despite its clear nonconformity with the Good, and examining the Leibnizian concept of “judgment,” Leibniz’s tripod can be (...) upheld. (shrink)

The notion of “expression”, which infuses the whole Leibnizian thought, originates, at least partially, from mathematics, for it appears explicitly in the corpus of the author, after his Parisian initiation to modern mathematics. The crucial point then consists in drawing the path that leads Leibniz from his first mathematical works about quadrature of the circle, differential calculus and series, and his discovery of perspective projection, to the notion of “expression”. Then, many mathematical elements seem to be inscribed in the very (...) nature of “expression”: the idea of transformation and preservation, of relationship between finite and infinite, or still of envelopment and development. Now, it turns out that these elements, if they are considered merely in their mathematical dimension, are sometimes more problematic than enlightening when the question is grasping what “expression” means in its metaphysical instances, and consequently that “expression” cannot be reduced to a mere mathematical notion. (shrink)

Kuvittelukyky tai imaginaatio esiintyy varsin harvoin Leibnizin kirjoituksissa ja siksi siitä ei ole kovin laajalti keskusteltu Leibniz-kommentaareissa ennen kuin aivan viime aikoina. Näissäkin tapauksissa keskustelu on pitkälti rajoittunut kuvittelukyvyn rooliin tiedostuksessa. Yritän tässä esitelmässä vetää sillan kuvittelukyvyn ja moraalisen toiminnan välille, jota tietääkseni ei ole ennen varsinaisesti tehty.

G. W. Leibnizin mielenfilosofiassa ymmärrykselle on jatkuvasti läsnä erilaisia taipumuksia erilaisiin päämääriin. Nämä taipumukset tai syyt toimia jollakin tavoin saattavat perustua selviin ja tarkkoihin havaintoihin ja olla tiedostettuja ennakkotahtomuksia. Näiden lisäksi mielessämme on epälukuinen määrä epäselviin havaintoihin perustuvia tiedostamattomia ja hetkittäisiä passioita, oikkuja tai hurahduksia. Kun henkilö ryhtyy harkitsemaan toimintaansa, nämä erilaiset taipumukset ja ennakkotahtomukset alkavat ottaa mittaa toisistaan. Prosessin tuloksena on lopullinen tahtomus tai riittävä syy. Kun ymmärrys on muodostanut suosituksen, tahto seuraa Leibnizin mukaan sitä ja toteuttaa ao. toiminnan. (...) -/- Ideaalitapauksessa ymmärryksen suositus on optimi näistä eri suuntiin johtavista syistä. Tavallisesti kyseessä on kuitenkin kompromissi, joka johtuu epäselvien havaintojen häiritsevästä vaikutuksesta harkintaan. Mitä paremmin ymmärrys toimii ja mitä tarkempia havainnot ovat, sen parempi on ymmärryksen toimintasuositus ja sita vahvemmalla ovat selvän ja tarkan joukkue epäselvän joukkuetta vastaan. Kuvaan esitelmässäni ylläolevan tilanteen ja tarkastelen tapoja, jolla agentti voi vaikuttaa toimintaansa. Vertailen myös pikaisesti Hobbesin ja Leibnizin näkemyksiä riittävästä syystä. (shrink)

In what follows, I will detail Kant's criticism of the Leibnizian conception of mind as it is presented in key chapters of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft . Approaching Kant with such a focus goes against the current predominant in contemporary Kant scholarship. Kant's engagement with Leibniz in the KrV is often taken as limited to the refutation of the latter's relational theory of space and time in the Aesthetic and the general criticism presented in the Amphiboly chapter, inasmuch as (...) Kant is taken to be primarily concerned with addressing empiricist opponents (a focus particularly evident in the English-language commentary). In addition, the argument against rational psychology in the Paralogisms is taken as challenging an essentially Cartesian position. The first two chapters of this project will introduce the Leibnizian conception of the mind, contrasting it with its Cartesian predecessor, and consider the career of the Leibnizian conception in the schools of 18th century Germany. As I will show, it was the Leibnizian conception of mind that held sway, despite scattered challenges, and that would have primarily been on Kant's mind when he turned to consider the extravagant claims of metaphysical psychology. In chapters 3-5, I turn to Kant's criticism of this conception as presented in the Transcendental Analytic of the KrV . There, I show how the subjective and objective deductions, in addition to the Amphiboly chapter, all address the Leibnizian claim of a parallelism between the investigations of the mental and the physical. In chapters 6-8, I consider the case against the Leibnizian conception of mind as presented in the Transcendental Dialectic, claiming that the doctrine of transcendental illusion plays an important (though largely ignored) role in explaining the grounds of the Leibnizian conception as it is transmitted in the rational psychology of Wolff, Baumgarten, Crusius, and Kant himself in the 1770's. Moreover, I argue that the limits Kant sets to empirical psychology are consistent with his criticism of the Leibnizian conception of mind, and, significantly, are motivated by deeper practical concerns. (shrink)

Human deliberation is a complicated and a difficult process. When forming moral judgement, various reasons inclinate the agent without necessitating him or her and the final result is more or less a compromise between these different spurs for action. Choosing right requires clear mind, good habits and strength of will. However, by a kind of self-manipulation moral development is possible. In my presentation, I shall discuss the forming of moral judgement in the intellect, consider the role of the passions in (...) deliberation and discuss how moral self-improvement takes place according to Leibniz in Nouveaux essais and Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum. (shrink)

La notion de mondes possibles chez Leibniz est souvent considérée comme un précurseur des théories contemporaines de la sémantique des mondes possibles. Or, cet article vise à montrer que cette lecture de Leibniz est fondamentalement erronée. Leibniz n'a jamais utilisé la notion de mondes possibles pour établir des conditions de vérité pour des phrases modales, mais le rôle de cette notion est strictement théologique, dans le sens où Leibniz l'emploie uniquement pour rendre compte du choix de Dieu dans la création. (...) Dans un premier temps, nous présentons une critique des tentatives d'interpréter les phrases modales chez Leibniz en termes de monde possibles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous nous proposons de montrer que les mondes possibles fonctionnent comme des raisons du choix divin, et que cette thèse est liée à la conception leibnizienne de la nature de la liberté. (shrink)

Artikkeli Leibnizin ja Hobbesin harkinnasta ja tahdosta / An article on the views of deliberation and willing in Leibniz and Hobbes.

As Leibniz had hoped, the publication of his ‘Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances...’ in 1695 provoked discussion of his metaphysics. Amongst the reactions was that of the French Benedictine, François Lamy, in his De la Connaissance de soi-même. It is not unusual to find the different editions of this work being confused, to the detriment of a proper understanding of the relation between Lamy’s texts and Leibniz’s. No doubt the rarity of copies of De (...) la Connaissance is at least partly responsible for this confusion, and it is because of that rarity that Lamy’s discussion of Leibniz is made available and reprinted here. (shrink)

As Leibniz had hoped, the publication of his ‘Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances...’ in 1695 provoked discussion of his metaphysics. Amongst the reactions was that of the French Benedictine, François Lamy, in his De la Connaissance de soi-même. It is not unusual to find the different editions of this work being confused, to the detriment of a proper understanding of the relation between Lamy’s texts and Leibniz’s. No doubt the rarity of copies of De (...) la Connaissance is at least partly responsible for this confusion, and it is because of that rarity that Lamy’s discussion of Leibniz is made available and reprinted here. (shrink)

During the first half of the twentieth century most Leibniz scholarship followed what has come to be the "received" interpretation of Leibniz in the English speaking world. This interpretation, developed by Bertrand Russell, is distinguished by the fact that it denies the importance of Leibniz's theological interests to his philosophical system. In this dissertation I show that Leibniz's theological beliefs cannot be ignored in trying to understand his philosophical views. I specifically look at two elements of Leibniz's views, his faculty (...) psychology and his view on the relation between divine foreknowledge and human freedom, to show that they have not been well understood and that they provide essential insights into Leibniz's view of freedom. I conclude, contrary to the near-universal interpretation of Leibniz now current, that given Leibniz's theological views it is unlikely that he is a determinist, but that it is also unlikely that he falls into any of the other categories used by contemporary philosophers in the discussion of human freedom, viz., determinism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. (shrink)

The comparative study of Islamic philosophical views to those of contemporary philosophers calls for careful consideration of their opinions.This is because the similarities are apparent but the purport of what they say is quite different. Yet, the apparent similarities should not be thoroughly ignored and one can perhaps say that Leibniz's theory of perception and apperception is epistemologically close to the Sadrean theory of conceptual and judgmental knowledge. At least one can say that although Leibniz belongs to the tradition of (...) Modern Western Philosophy, his theory concerning the relationship between being and knowledge stands somewhere in the midpoint between Mulla Sadra and Berkley.Berkely has stated that to be is to be perceived and Mulla Sadra regards Knowledge as Being.In other words, in the eyes of the Scottish philosopher, existence is the same as perception and our philosopher has argued that perception is existence. Even if Leibniz may. in reality be closer to Berkley than Mulla Sadra but in view of the fact that knowledge is a constituent of Leibniz's monads and knowledge has different grades according to him, it is as if he would corroborate Sadra's theory concerning the unity of being and knowledge. (shrink)

Kant describes logic as “the science that exhaustively presents and strictly proves nothing but the formal rules of all thinking”. (Bviii-ix) But what is the source of our cognition of such rules (“logical cognition” for short)? He makes no concerted effort to address this question. It will nonetheless become clear that the question is a philosophically significant one for him, to which he can see three possible answers: those representations are innate, derived from experience, or originally acquired a priori. Although (...) he gives no explicit argument for the third answer, he seems committed to it—especially given his views on the source of pure concepts of the understanding and on the nature of logic. It takes careful preparatory work to gather all the essential materials for motivating and reconstructing Kant’s “original acquisition” account of logical cognition. I shall proceed in two sections. In section 1, I analyze Kant’s argument that pure concepts of the understanding (or intellectual concepts)—as one kind of pure cognition—must be acquired originally and a priori. My analysis partly concerns his varied attitudes toward Crusius’s and Leibniz’s versions of the nativist account of such concepts. I give special attention to how Kant characterizes the nativist account and his own “original acquisition” account in terms of “preformation” and “epigenesis”. My goal is, firstly, to tease out the sense in which Kant grants that there must be an innate ground (or preformation) for the derivation of pure concepts and, secondly, to introduce—and pave the way for answering—the question about the source of logical cognition. In section 2, in light of Kant’s reference to Locke and Leibniz as the greatest reformers of philosophy (including logic) in their times (Log, AA 9: 32), I examine the Lockean and Leibnizian approaches to logic, respectively. Both approaches are “physiological” by Kant’s standard and are directly opposed to his own strictly critical method. I explain how this methodological move shapes Kant’s view that representations of logical rules must be originally acquired a priori. This acquisition involves a kind of radical epigenesis of pure reason: unlike the acquisition of pure concepts, it presupposes no further innate ground (or preformation). This view will have important consequences for issues such as the ground of the normativity of logical rules and the boundaries of their rightful use. (shrink)

The young Spinoza and the mature Leibniz both characterize the soul as a self-moving spiritual automaton. Though it is unclear if Leibniz’s use of the term was suggested to him from his reading of Spinoza, Leibniz was aware of its presence in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Considering Leibniz’s staunch opposition to Spinozism, the question arises as to why he was willing to adopt this term. I propose an answer to this question by comparing the spiritual automaton (...) in both philosophers. For Spinoza, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it overcomes imaginative ideas and produces true ideas. For Leibniz, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it spontaneously produces its perceptions according to the universal harmony preestablished by God. Thus, for Leibniz contra Spinoza, the spiritual automaton is a means to render intelligible a providential order in which everything happens for the best. (shrink)

Keskityn siihen miten Leibnizilla yksittäiset mielihyvän tai mielipahan tiedostamattomat havainnot voivat kasautua tai tiivistyä ja muodostaa vähitellen tunteita, joista tulemme tietoisiksi.