Abstract

Drawing on C. S. Peirce's notion of an "unlimited community of investigators," Jürgen Habermas seeks to construct binding moral norms apart from independently existing moral absolutes. But Habermas fatally compromises the usefulness of an unlimited community for his project. Where Peirce relied on the notion of a uniform "outward clash" with external reality or "secondness" to lead all members of his unlimited community of investigators to a "predestinate" point of convergence, Habermas lacks any notion of an independent moral reality to bring about this convergence throughout his unlimited community of constructors. Apart from devising a substitute secondness to replace the clash with external moral reality, Habermas' unlimited community will spin apart into countless divergent moral constructs, Habermas' attempts to devise a substitute secondness fouruier on a lifeworld dilemma he never resolves, Habermas' difficulties are instructive, suggesting a possible way forward.