Scientific Knowledge: Discovery of Nature or Mental Construction?

University Press of America (1992)
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Abstract

This book defends the constructivist view of science, namely, the view that scientific theories are mental constructions in the mind of the scientist, rather than the realist view that scientific theories are accounts of what nature itself is like. To prove this point, evolution theory is contrasted with "creation science" as two paradigms or extremely divergent theories, each of which, as a mental construct, explains the data or facts of the natural world equally well. Contents: Realism vs. Constructivism; Meaning and Reference in the Natural Sciences; The Role of Paradigm in the Creationism Controversy; Science As Mental Construction.

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