Plato's causal logic and the third man argument

Noûs 20 (4):507-530 (1986)
(1) anything that fs does so because it participates in the f itself. (2) it is impossible that: a form phi fs because phi participates in phi. (3) the f itself fs. These are inconsistent all right, but (1) is not a doctrine of the theory of forms, and (2) is neither reasonable nor held by plato! but the tma does not involve any of these three. Rather, the tma is aimed at (4) anything that fs does so (a) because it participates in the f itself and (b) because the f itself fs. And the tma uses only simple inference rules of the logic of 'because'–no suppressed premises. I also discuss causal regress arguments generally
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DOI 10.2307/2214982
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A Logic for 'Because'.Benjamin Schnieder - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):445-465.
Propositions United.Benjamin Schnieder - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):289-301.

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