The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness

Authors
Tim Bayne
Monash University
Nicholas Shea
School of Advanced Study, University of London
Abstract
Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some vegetative state patients might indeed be conscious, although they fall short of being demonstrative. The fact that some vegetative state patients show evidence of consciousness according to the standard approach is remarkable, for the standard approach to consciousness is rather conservative, and leaves open the pressing question of how to ascertain whether patients who fail such tests are conscious or not. We argue for a cluster-based ‘natural kind’ methodology that is adequate to that task, both as a replacement for the approach that currently informs research into the presence or absence of consciousness in vegetative state patients and as a methodology for the science of consciousness more generally. IntroductionThe Vegetative StateThe Standard ApproachThe Natural Kind MethodologyIs Consciousness a Special Case? 5.1 Is consciousness a natural kind?5.2 A special obstacle?Conclusion
Keywords consciousness  measures of consciousness  markers of consciousness  neural correlates of consciousness  vegetative state  disorders of consciousness
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axp046
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
A Tradition of Natural Kinds.Ian Hacking - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):109-26.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Taxonomy for Disorders of Consciousness That Takes Consciousness Seriously.Andrew Peterson & Tim Bayne - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3):153-155.
Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind.Nicholas Shea - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):307-344.
Explaining What?Elizabeth Irvine - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):95-106.

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