Ruling out Lucky Proofs

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 96 (2):262-277 (2014)
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Abstract

:According to Leibniz’s theory for contingent truths about created individuals, this kind of truth cannot be proved in a finite number of steps, because the analyses of the concepts corresponding to these individuals required for the proofs proceed to infinity. Some commentators pointed out that such truths.

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10.1515/agph-2014-0012

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