Modal logic based theory for non-monotonic reasoning

Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 3 (1):73-92 (1993)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper defines a new modal logic based theory for non-monotonic reasoning. This logic expresses notions about hypotheses and known information. These notions are defined in the framework of the modal system τ. A translation of default logic in terms of hypothesis theory is given with which it is possible to fully characterize default logic by giving a necessary and sufficient criterion for the existence and the non-existence of extensions. Moreover several problems relating to non-monotonic reasoning are discussed (and solutions are presented), such as case analysis, multiple extensions and contraposition

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References found in this work

A logic for default reasoning.Ray Reiter - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):81-137.
Circumscription — A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning.John McCarthy - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):27–39.
Semantic Considerations on nonmonotonic Logic.Robert C. Moore - 1985 - Artificial Intelligence 25 (1):75-94.
On the relation between default and autoepistemic logic.Kurt Konolige - 1988 - Artificial Intelligence 35 (3):343-382.
Formalizing nonmonotonic reasoning systems.David W. Etherington - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 31 (1):41-85.

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