Dennett's reduction of Brentano's intentionality

Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7 (2008)
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In this paper I compare two different approaches to the supposed distinction between the mental and the physical: 1. Brentano's theory of `Intentionality', which, in its early formulation, proposes a true distinction between physical objects and the objects of thought; and 2. Dennett's `Intentional Systems Theory', which is an attempt to naturalise the mind and to reduce mental phenomena such as beliefs and desires to simple physical systems.



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Brent Silby
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Naturalism and the mental.Michael Tye - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):421-441.

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