Authors
Jonathan Smith
University of Houston
Abstract
Freedom, and in particular, the freedom of human beings, is a hot topic within the field of metaphysics. In this paper, instead of arguing for the truth of a particular position on freedom, I explore whether a particular position, compatibilism, might be consistent with the existence of moral responsibility and retributive justice. To alleviate ambiguity, I construct a model by which the four primary positions on freedom might be clearly understood. I then distinguish between what I call ‘common-sense’ views of moral responsibility, and ‘complex’ views of moral responsibility. I select a particular complex view, which I term the ‘virtue’ theory of moral responsibility, offer some justification for the sensibility of such a theory, and demonstrate how the virtue theory is consistent with compatibilism. Finally, I propose that retributive justice is consistent with the virtue theory of moral responsibility, and consequently, that retributive justice is consistent with compatibilism.
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References found in this work BETA

Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1964 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will. Blackwell.
The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.Peter van Inwagen - 1998 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 365-373.
Responsibility for Consequences.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1993 - In J. Fischer M. Ravizza (ed.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press.
Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.

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