II- Dainton on Subjects of Experience

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):145-159 (2016)
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Abstract

The paper discusses some of the themes in Professor Dainton’s article ‘The Sense of Self’. In the first part it is proposed that some of the arguments in favour of the theory that Dainton proposes are questionable, and that in its more extreme version there are features which look doubtful. A simpler account of subjects is then proposed. In the second part some aspects of Dainton’s discussion of the sense of self are analysed. It is argued that although Dainton’s own account of our sense of self is not obviously correct, the views he is opposed to are not well supported, nor is the debate very clear.

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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.
Persons, Animals, Ourselves.Paul F. Snowdon (ed.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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