Breaking Mindset

Mind and Language 13 (1):1-10 (1998)
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Abstract

A fundamental question facing the cognitive sciences is why it is so difficult for us to look at the world in new ways. Experts, in particular, appear to have extreme difficulty in questioning the foundations for their belief. This I argue is because we can only view our world through mental paradigms. Such paradigms, our mindsets, have evolved so that we can respond automatically to things of importance but, by having mindsets, we are intrinsically prejudiced. I suggest that infantile autism provides valuable insight into what a mind would be like if it were not to have paradigms. Because we are constrained to look at the world through our mindsets, the only way to see more is to acquire more mindsets. But, to actually be original, it is also necessary to subvert conventional wisdom and this would appear to be culturally dependent. Accordingly, understanding creativity necessitates examining the collective perspectives of diverse disciplines, encompassing abnormal minds as well as the historical transformations of different cultures.

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