Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):108-115 (2012)

Authors
Giuseppe Spolaore
University of Padua
Abstract
So-called Locke's thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke's thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of the same kind. It is argued that anyone who subscribes to certain standard metaphysical arguments, which are generally taken for granted in the debate about Locke's thesis, is virtually compelled to accept the counter-examples
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.12
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References found in this work BETA

On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
Sameness and Substance Renewed.E. J. Lowe - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):816-820.
A Counter-Example to Locke’s Thesis.Kit Fine - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):357-361.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conjoined twinning & biological individuation.Alexandria Boyle - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2395-2415.
Mind the Gap.Jeroen Smid - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-17.
Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle.Jessica Gordon-Roth - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (4):264-274.
Material Constitution.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.

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