Practical Philosophy and the Concept of Autonomy: A Critique of Kantian Ethics

Dissertation, Boston University (1984)
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the conceptual limitations of Kant's ethical theory with the purpose of assessing its suitability as a model of practical philosophy based upon the idea of autonomy. My aim is not only to exhibit the specific weaknesses in Kant's treatment of morality, but also to explore a contrast between two different approaches in ethical theory. This contrast can be characterized in terms of an opposition between a 'formal-individualistic' and a 'social-historical' model for the analysis and derivation of ethical principles. The crucial problem here is whether an ethical theory can be constructed on the exiguous basis of concepts such as the 'rationality' or 'freedom' of the will, or whether it requires an insight into the connection between moral principles and specific conditions of historical and social life that constitute the real foundation of moral judgment. ;The dissertation is composed of four chapters. In Chapter One I consider the deficiencies in Kant's treatment of the historical and temporal dimensions of moral volition. I focus especially upon his neglect of the conditions of historical genesis that underlie the framework of moral concepts he analyzes. In the second and third chapters I examine Kant's failure to attend to the social dimension of morality and distinguish two separate parts to this objection: difficulties resulting from his restriction of the scope of moral freedom to the domain of an agent's inner intentions, so that a consideration of the consequences of action is excluded, and problems arising from his monological interpretation of the universalization procedure. Finally, in Chapter Four I argue that Kant's neglect of the historical and social dimensions of morality is by no means accidental. Rather, it is a function of his reliance upon a two-world metaphysical framework in which moral principles are understood essentially as the laws governing a purely rational, non-natural order. The dependence of Kant's ethical theory upon 'problematic' metaphysical premises--particularly in his justification of the moral law--suggests that the two dimensions he excludes from his analysis--history and society--must be integrated within it in order to yield a more convincing elaboration of the basic concepts of morality

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