Autism, Metacognition, and the Deep Self

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):446-464 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT:Many ‘deep self’ theories of moral responsibility characterize the deep self as necessarily requiring that an agent be able to reflect on her own cognitive states in various ways. In this paper, I argue that these metacognitive abilities are not actually a necessary feature of the deep self. In order to show this, I appeal to empirical evidence from research on autism spectrum disorders that suggests that individuals with ASD have striking impairments in metacognitive abilities. I then argue that metacognitive conceptions of the deep self are implausible insofar as they fail to give a satisfactory account of the responsibility of persons with autism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,635

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mindreading Underlies Metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.
Replies to Commentaries.Ingar Brinck - 2013 - Infant and Child Development 22:111-117.
Unwitting Self‐Awareness?Peter Langland-Hassan - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):719-726.
The Philosophy of Autism.Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.) - 2012 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
""Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.
Thoughts About the Autism Label: A Parental View.Charlotte Moore - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (3-4):493-498.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-03-24

Downloads
38 (#305,067)

6 months
4 (#172,750)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nathan Stout
Tulane University

Citations of this work

On the Significance of Praise.Nathan Stout - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):215-226.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?David Premack & G. Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (4):515-629.
Responsibility as Answerability.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):99-126.
Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency.Jeanette Kennett - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):340-357.

View all 13 references / Add more references