The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):401-418 (2016)

Nathan Stout
Tulane University
In this paper, I consider a novel challenge to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s reasons-responsiveness theory of moral responsibility. According to their view, agents possess the control necessary for moral responsibility if their actions proceed from a mechanism that is moderately reasons-responsive. I argue that their account of moderate reasons-responsiveness fails to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for moral responsibility since it cannot give an adequate account of the responsibility of individuals with autism spectrum disorder. Empirical evidence suggests that autistic individuals demonstrate impairments in counterfactual thinking, and these impairments, I argue, are such that they cast doubt on Fischer and Ravizza’s construal of moderate reasons-responsiveness. I then argue that modifying the view in order to accommodate individuals with ASD forces them to defend a strong reasons-responsive account despite the fact that they explicitly deny that such an account can adequately characterize what it is to be morally responsible for one’s actions.
Keywords Moral Responsibility  Moral Psychology  Reasons-Responsiveness  Fischer and Ravizza  Autism Spectrum Disorder
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DOI 10.1007/s10892-016-9218-9
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References found in this work BETA

The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul.Joshua Greene - 2007 - In W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3. MIT Press.
The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):373-381.

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Citations of this work BETA

CAPS Psychology and the Empirical Adequacy of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.Laura Papish - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):537-549.
Emotional Awareness and Responsible Agency.Nathan Stout - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):337-362.
Autism, Metacognition, and the Deep Self.Nathan Stout - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (4):446-464.
Why C-Luck Really is a Problem for Compatibilism.S. B. Schoonover & Ivan Guajardo - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):48-69.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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