Free will

In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. New York: Routledge (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

‘Free will’ is the conventional name of a topic that is best discussed without reference to the will. It is a topic in metaphysics and ethics as much as in the philosophy of mind. Its central questions are ‘What is it to act (or choose) freely?’, and ‘What is it to be morally responsible for one’s actions (or choices)?’ These two questions are closely connected, for it seems clear that freedom of action is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, even if it is not sufficient

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free Will: The Basics.Meghan Griffith - 2013 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Free Agents.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32:371-402.
Free Will.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2011 - Malden, MA: Polity.
Free Will.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2011 - Malden, MA: Polity.
Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.
Free will.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free will and moral responsibility in video games.Christopher Bartel - 2015 - Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):285-293.
Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 89-91.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
337 (#62,762)

6 months
27 (#136,614)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Galen Strawson
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
Is it time for robot rights? Moral status in artificial entities.Vincent C. Müller - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (3):579–587.
Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.

View all 42 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references