Abstract

In my paper, I partially defend Philippa Foot’s view in answering the question ‘why be moral?’ In her book, Natural Goodness(2001) and her final paper, “Rationality and Goodness” (2004), Foot proposes two ideas: Ethical Naturalism and, what I call, the ‘Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality’. In answering the question ‘why be moral?’, I argue that we should abandon the former and adopt the latter. In Section I, I discuss Foot’s Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality. In Section II, I examine Foot’s Ethical Naturalism. I argue that it is no longer defensible. In Section III, I examine other possible ways to integrate the categories of practical rationality. One is to take a utilitarian approach and another is to take a Kantian approach. I argue that the latter approach is in harmony with Foot’s Anti-Humean Theory of Practical Rationality.