Against structured referring expressions

Philosophical Studies 146 (1):49 - 74 (2009)
Following Neale, I call the notion that there can be no such thing as a structured referring expression ‘structure skepticism’. The specific aim of this paper is to defuse some putative counterexamples to structure skepticism. The general aim is to bolster the case in favor of the thesis that lack of structure—in a sense to be made precise—is essential to reference.
Keywords Philosophy of language  Philosophical logic  Reference  Semantics  Stephen Neale
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9244-y
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Reference and Reflexivity.John Perry - 2009 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Harvard University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Intentionality.John Searle - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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