Conclusion

In Which rights should be universal? New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

In this chapter, Talbott considers how, if human psychology were different, it could have been discovered that autonomy was a burden for human beings and thus that human beings should not be guaranteed autonomy rights. Talbott also explains his metaphysical immodesty with an example of why he believes human rights norms apply universally. Talbott ends with a reminder that, in exercising our judgment and our self-determination, all of us play a role in the bottom-up social-historical process of the discovery and development and implementation of human rights.

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William J. Talbott
University of Washington

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