25 found
Order:
Disambiguations
William J. Talbott [19]William Talbott [6]
See also
William J. Talbott
University of Washington
  1. Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    ‘Bayesian epistemology’ became an epistemological movement in the 20th century, though its two main features can be traced back to the eponymous Reverend Thomas Bayes (c. 1701-61). Those two features are: (1) the introduction of a formal apparatus for inductive logic; (2) the introduction of a pragmatic self-defeat test (as illustrated by Dutch Book Arguments) for epistemic rationality as a way of extending the justification of the laws of deductive logic to include a justification for the laws of inductive logic. (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  2.  57
    Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.
  3. Human Rights and Human Well-Being.William Talbott - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The consequentialist project for human rights -- Exceptions to libertarian natural rights -- The main principle -- What is well-being? What is equity? -- The two deepest mysteries in moral philosophy -- Security rights -- Epistemological foundations for the priority of autonomy rights -- The millian epistemological argument for autonomy rights -- Property rights, contract rights, and other economic rights -- Democratic rights -- Equity rights -- The most reliable judgment standard for weak paternalism -- Liberty rights and privacy rights (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4.  50
    How Could a “Blind” Evolutionary Process Have Made Human Moral Beliefs Sensitive to Strongly Universal, Objective Moral Standards?William J. Talbott - 2015 - Biology and Philosophy 30 (5):691-708.
    The evolutionist challenge to moral realism is the skeptical challenge that, if evolution is true, it would only be by chance, a “happy coincidence” as Sharon Street puts it, if human moral beliefs were true. The author formulates Street’s “happy coincidence” argument more precisely using a distinction between probabilistic sensitivity and insensitivity introduced by Elliott Sober. The author then considers whether it could be rational for us to believe that human moral judgments about particular cases are probabilistically sensitive to strongly (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  5.  47
    A Non-Probabilist Principle of Higher-Order Reasoning.William Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).
    The author uses a series of examples to illustrate two versions of a new, nonprobabilist principle of epistemic rationality, the special and general versions of the metacognitive, expected relative frequency principle. These are used to explain the rationality of revisions to an agent’s degrees of confidence in propositions based on evidence of the reliability or unreliability of the cognitive processes responsible for them—especially reductions in confidence assignments to propositions antecedently regarded as certain—including certainty-reductions to instances of the law of excluded (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6.  59
    Which Rights Should Be Universal?William J. Talbott - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    "We hold these truths to be self-evident..." So begins the U.S. Declaration of Independence. What follows those words is a ringing endorsement of universal rights, but it is far from self-evident. Why did the authors claim that it was? William Talbott suggests that they were trapped by a presupposition of Enlightenment philosophy: That there was only one way to rationally justify universal truths, by proving them from self-evident premises. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the authors of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  7.  76
    A New Reliability Defeater for Evolutionary Naturalism.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):538-564.
    The author identifies the structure of Sharon Street's skeptical challenge to non-naturalist, normative epistemic realism as an argument that NNER is liable to reliability defeat and then argues that Street's argument fails, because it itself is subject to reliability defeat. As the author reconstructs Street's argument, it is an argument that the normative epistemic judgments of the realist could only be probabilistically sensitive to normative epistemic truths by sheer chance. The author then recaps Street's own naturalist translation of normative epistemic (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  64
    Consequentialism and Human Rights.William J. Talbott - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1030-1040.
    The article begins with a review of the structural differences between act consequentialist theories and human rights theories, as illustrated by Amartya Sen's paradox of the Paretian liberal and Robert Nozick's utilitarianism of rights. It discusses attempts to resolve those structural differences by moving to a second-order or indirect consequentialism, illustrated by J.S. Mill and Derek Parfit. It presents consequentialist (though not utilitarian) interpretations of the contractualist theories of Jürgen Habermas and the early John Rawls (Theory of Justice) and of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9.  59
    Transformative Experience.William Talbott - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):380-388.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10.  76
    Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory.William J. Talbott - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):827-833.
  11.  20
    Is Epistemic Circularity a Fallacy?William J. Talbott - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    The author uses a series of potential counterexamples to argue against attempts by Bergmann and Plantinga to articulate a distinction between malignant and benign epistemic circularity and, more radically, to argue that epistemic circularity per se is no fallacy, and the concept of epistemic circularity plays no role in the explanation of why some instances of epistemic circularity are irrational. The author contrasts an inferential framework, in which circularity is a problem, with an equilibrium framework, in which the concept of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. The Reliability of the Cognitive Mechanism: A Mechanist Account of Empirical Justification.William J. Talbott - 1990 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1990. Examining epistemic justification, truth and logic, this book works towards a holistic theory of knowledge. It discusses evidence, belief, reliability and many philosophical theories surrounding the nature of true knowledge. A thorough Preface updates the main work from when it was written in 1976 to include theories ascendant in the ‘80s.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13.  31
    Games Lawyers Play: Legal Discovery and Social Epistemology: William J. Talbott and Alvin I. Goldman.William J. Talbott - 1998 - Legal Theory 4 (2):93-163.
    In the movie Regarding Henry, the main character, Henry Turner, is a lawyer who suffers brain damage as a result of being shot during a robbery. Before being wounded, the Old Henry Turner had been a successful lawyer, admired as a fierce competitor and well-known for his killer instinct. As a result of the injury to his brain, the New Henry Turner loses the personality traits that had made the Old Henry such a formidable adversary.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14.  9
    Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.William J. Talbott - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):420-426.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15.  28
    The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology.William J. Talbott - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):199-206.
    In his path-breaking recent book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman brings academic epistemology to bear on important real world issues in information technology, the media, science, law, politics, and education. Though the project that Goldman undertakes ramifies in many directions, the motivating idea is simple. Knowledge is important. Social institutions and practices can and should be evaluated on how well or how poorly they contribute to knowledge of propositions of interest. This is Goldman’s criterion of veritistic value, which, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16.  44
    The Case for a More Truly Social Epistemology. [REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):199–206.
    In his path-breaking recent book, Knowledge in a Social World, Alvin Goldman brings academic epistemology to bear on important real world issues in information technology, the media, science, law, politics, and education. Though the project that Goldman undertakes ramifies in many directions, the motivating idea is simple. Knowledge is important. Social institutions and practices can and should be evaluated on how well or how poorly they contribute to knowledge of propositions of interest. This is Goldman’s criterion of veritistic value, which, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17.  9
    Reply to Critics: In Defense of One Kind of Epistemically Modest But Metaphysically Immodest Liberalism. [REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2008 - Human Rights Review 9 (2):193-212.
    In this reply to his three critics, Talbott develops several important themes from his book, Which Rights Should Be Universal?, in ways that go beyond the discussion in the book. Among them are the following: the prescriptive role of human rights theory; the need to guarantee an expansive list of basic rights as a basis for a government to be able to claim recognitional legitimacy; the futility of trying to define human rights in terms of what there can be reasonable (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  13
    Universal Knowledge. [REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):420–426.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  2
    Universal Knowledge.William J. Talbott - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):420-426.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20.  30
    Forst, Rainer. The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice. Translated by Jeffrey Flynn. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Pp. X+351. $45.00. [REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):750-755.
  21.  9
    A Social Practice Prioritarian Response to Allen Buchanan’s The Heart of Human Rights.William Talbott - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (2):121-133.
    Allen Buchanan’s ‘The Heart of Human Rights’ addresses the moral justification of the international legal human rights system. Buchanan identifies two functions of the ILHRS: a well-being function and a status egalitarian function. Because Buchanan assumes that the well-being function is sufficientarian, he augments it with a status egalitarian function. However, if the well-being function is utilitarian or prioritarian, there is no need for a separate status egalitarian function, because the status egalitarian function can be subsumed by the utilitarian or (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  24
    Review of James Griffin, On Human Rights[REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
  23.  23
    Review of David Christensen, Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief[REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  24.  10
    The Elusiveness of a Non-Question-Begging Justification for Morality.William J. Talbott - 2014 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (1):191-204.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  1
    Review: Universal Knowledge. [REVIEW]William J. Talbott - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):420 - 426.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark