Abstract

The paper distinguishes two types of Platonist approach, namely the Traditional one and the Robust one. In relation to this distinction I am going to argue that if the ontology of mathematics is intended to be defended plausibly in a Platonist way then this cannot be done according to the Traditional version. This will draw our attention to the plausibility of the Robust version. The plausibility of the two versions of Platonism will be examined in relation to one of the central problems of the philosophy of mathematics, namely the truth-proof problem. The surveying of the truth-proof problem will bring to the surface the prima facie plausibility of the Platonist approach, as well as the apparent accessibility problem of it. Focusing on the accessibility problem will help us to identify two conditions that have to be met by any particular access theory of Platonism. These will be the reducibility condition, and the matching one. The Traditional version will appear an insufficient philosophical theory in relation to the two former conditions. The insufficiency will be demonstrated in the area of the incompatible mathematical theories, namely in the area of Euclidean and hyperbolic geometries. It will turn out that Robust Platonism can escape the squeeze of these conditions, so can it save the original prima facie plausibility of the Platonist approach.