Abstract

This is clearly an important anthology. Each contributor is a philosopher of considerable reputation and each article is a development of themes its author has expounded over a period of time. Quine examines two questions: the nature of the data of experience and measurement of theoreticity or distance from the data. Why does Quine, who rejects classical sense data, continue to raise questions about the location of "data?" Why supplant the old sensory atomism with a new sensory atomism? An alternative would be to build a "first philosophy" on awareness of physical objects without recourse to "data." This approach would preserve one element of classical theories while rejecting another —precisely the opposite effect of Quine’s view. Goodman’s article is an attack upon some blithe assumptions about the helpfulness of invoking the relation of similarity to solve philosophical problems. The argument does not seem strong enough, however, to warrant the concluding claim that statements of similarity have henceforth been eliminated "from the philosopher’s dwindling kit." Variations in the viewpoints, etc., of perceivers need not affect similarities of objects but only which similarities are averted to. Parts of Goodman’s argument appear to assume the opposite.