Mental powers and the soul in Kant’s Subjective Deduction and the Second Paralogism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):426-452 (2016)
Authors
Steven Tester
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Abstract
Kant’s claim in the Subjective Deduction that we have multiple fundamental mental powers appears to be susceptible to some a priori metaphysical arguments made against multiple fundamental mental powers by Christian Wolff who held that these powers would violate the unity of thought and entail that the soul is an extended composite. I argue, however, that in the Second Paralogism and his lectures on metaphysics, Kant provides arguments that overcome these objections by showing that it is possible that a composite could ground the unity of thought, that properties are powers and therefore the soul could possess multiple powers, and the soul is a thing in itself so it cannot be an extended composite. These arguments lend additional support to the attribution of multiple mental powers to us in the Subjective Deduction.
Keywords Kant  Wolff  Rationalism  Metaphysics  Subjective Deduction
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2016.1191746
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References found in this work BETA

Does Kant Demand Explanations for All Synthetic A Priori Claims?Colin Marshall - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (3):549-576.
The Bounds of Sense.P. F. Strawson - 1967 - Philosophy 42 (162):379-382.
Kant's First Paralogism.Ian Proops - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):449–495.

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