Abstract
Dynamical-systems analysis is nowadays ubiquitous. From engineering (its point of origin and natural home) to physiology, and from psychology to ecology, it enjoys surprisingly wide application. Sometimes the analysis rings decisively false—as, for example, when adopted in certain treatments of historical narrative; other times it is provocative and controversial, as when applied to the phenomena of mind and cognition. Dynamical systems analysis (or “Systems” with a capital “S,” as I shall sometimes refer to it) is simply a tool of analysis. It mobilizes the language and mathematical technology of differential equations, and brings into play the distinctive concepts of equilibrium and attractor, as well as gain, coupling and neighborhood, that are not obviously proprietary property of any particular domain of objects or regime in the world. It is the ecumenical language of engineers, universal in scope. Still, Systems, as a mode of analysis, itself stands in need of clarification. Once that clarity has been attained, one can then ask: are there limitations or bounds on proper application of Systems analysis, that are themselves premised upon considerations internal to the analysis itself? This is one of several questions to which the present essay is devoted. Before it can be attempted, however, we shall require some groundwork that clarifies the mode of analysis that is Systems—the family of analyses to which it belongs. This will begin to bring out (among other things) the precise difference of subject matter between biology and physics. And the ecumenicality of Systems analysis is bound to have its own distinctive commitments, as we shall see. Practitioners attuned to the signal characteristics of Systems analysis—characteristics that set it apart—proclaim its many advantages.