Abstract

In this essay I contend: that theories of truth which focus on methods by which truth is ascertained, e.g., pragmatism, encounter difficulties; that medieval theory of truth has elements, which enable it to avoid such difficulties; and that viewing pragmatic theory of truth in terms of these elements enables it to withstand these difficulties. ;In Chapter One, first I pose certain problems in theory of truth and indicate the methodological turn theory of truth has taken in response. Second, pragmatism is introduced as an example of such a theory. Third, I cite the advantages to truth-theory resulting from the methodological turn. Fourth, I present objections raised, first against pragmatism, then against any methodology-based truth-theory. ;In Chapter Two, I introduce medieval theory of truth as a way to circumvent the difficulties presented in Chaper One. I first consider unique aspects of the medieval approach to truth. Then I present the truth-theories of three medieval philosophers--Anselm, Bonaventure, and Aquinas--focusing on four principal factors in the theories of each. These four structural factors are: an unchallenged metaphysical primitive ; grounding of criteria of inquiry and truth-ascription in the primitive; faith in the primitive; and specification of values--intellectual, moral, and theological virtues--as important components in truth-theory. These factors constitute the nucleus of a medieval theory of methodology. ;In Chapter Three, I employ these four factors to demonstrate medieval truth-theory's ability to withstand the objections raised against methodology-based theories of truth. Next, I suggest that some version of these factors is present in any adequate theory of truth, though they need not retain the theological character they have in medieval truth-theory. Then I identify non-theological forms of these four factors in pragmatic truth-theory and show how, employing these, pragmatic truth-theory is able to withstand the criticisms adduced in Chapter One. ;In the Epilogue, I suggest that there are structural affinities between medieval and pragmatic theories of truth, that other, more linguistically-oriented theories of truth have some, non-theological, form of the four fundamental features, and that any successful theory of truth incorporates these features in some form