Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43 (2011)

Authors
Ryan Christensen
Brigham Young University
Abstract
Formal theories, as in logic and mathematics, are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, are often far less formal. There are many axiomatic theories of the truth predicate for certain formal languages; on analogy with these, some philosophers (most notably Paul Horwich) have proposed axiomatic theories of the property of truth. Though in many ways similar to logical theories, axiomatic theories of truth must be different in several nontrivial ways. I explore what an axiomatic theory of truth would look like. Because Horwich’s is the most prominent, I examine his theory and argue that it fails as a theory of truth. Such a theory is adequate if, given a suitable base theory, every fact about truth is a consequence of the axioms of the theory. I show, using an argument analogous to Gödel’s incompleteness proofs, that no axiomatic theory of truth could ever be adequate. I also argue that a certain class of generalizations cannot be consequences of the theory
Keywords Truth  Axiomatic theories  Deflationism  Paul Horwich
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-011-0075-5
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford University Press USA.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.

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Citations of this work BETA

McGee on Horwich.Ryan Christensen - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):205-218.

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