Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43 (2011)
Formal theories, as in logic and mathematics, are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, are often far less formal. There are many axiomatic theories of the truth predicate for certain formal languages; on analogy with these, some philosophers (most notably Paul Horwich) have proposed axiomatic theories of the property of truth. Though in many ways similar to logical theories, axiomatic theories of truth must be different in several nontrivial ways. I explore what an axiomatic theory of truth would look like. Because Horwich’s is the most prominent, I examine his theory and argue that it fails as a theory of truth. Such a theory is adequate if, given a suitable base theory, every fact about truth is a consequence of the axioms of the theory. I show, using an argument analogous to Gödel’s incompleteness proofs, that no axiomatic theory of truth could ever be adequate. I also argue that a certain class of generalizations cannot be consequences of the theory
|Keywords||Truth Axiomatic theories Deflationism Paul Horwich|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Relative Truth Definability of Axiomatic Truth Theories.Kentaro Fujimoto - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):305-344.
On Rules of Inference and the Meanings of Logical Constants.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - Analysis 68 (300):282-287.
Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (6):551 - 559.
Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism.James O. Young - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):563-575.
Theories of Truth Without Standard Models and Yablo's Sequences.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2010 - Studia Logica 96 (3):375-391.
Deflationism, Conservativeness and Maximality.Cezary Cieśliński - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):695 - 705.
Added to index2011-03-13
Total downloads78 ( #66,685 of 2,163,731 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #348,100 of 2,163,731 )
How can I increase my downloads?