Some Limitations to the Psychological Orientation in Semantic Theory

Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):1 - 14 (2011)
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Abstract

The psychological orientation treats semantics as a matter of idealized computation over symbolic structures, and semantic relations like denotation as relations between linguistic expressions and these structures. I argue that results similar to Gödel's incompleteness theorems and Tarski's theorem on truth create foundational difficulties for this view of semantics

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Richmond Thomason
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

The fixed points of belief and knowledge.Daniela Schuster - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
Variations on a Montagovian theme.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3377-3395.
Thomason’s Paradox for Belief, and Two Consequence Relations.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):15 - 32.
A Landscape of Logics beyond the Deduction Theorem.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):25-38.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
The foundations of arithmetic.Gottlob Frege - 1884/1950 - Evanston, Ill.,: Northwestern University Press.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
The nature and structure of content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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