'Humean' Rationality, Morality, and Reasons for Action

Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison (1988)
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Abstract

This thesis clarifies and defends the view of practical reason often dubbed "Humean", "instrumental", or "preference-based". Three familiar charges against this view are addressed, and claimed to be ineffective. They are: first, that the Humean view entails the easily refuted theory that all reasons for action have their source in individual desires; second, that it brings with it an extreme version of ethical relativism; and third, that it presupposes a view of motivation which has been shown to be false, or at least highly doubtful--the view, namely, that a desire is among the causal antecedents of any action. Against these charges I argue, first, that the Humean view does not entail that all reasons for action are desire-dependent; second, that it does not bring with it a version of moral relativism; and third, that although it does carry the implication that motivation has its source in desires, that implication is not threatened by standard arguments used against it.

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John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

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