Why Logic Doesn‘t Matter in the (Philosophical) Study of Argumentation

Argumentation 11 (2):211-224 (1997)
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Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation ’disappears from sight‘. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion.



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Tim Heysse
KU Leuven

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