Abstract

In this paper I analyze the importance of Kant’s account of principled solitude at the end of § 29 of the Third Critique. The scant attention paid to this passage by the scholarship has mistaken it to mean that solitude is a misanthropic attitude, a misreading that serves a prevailing interpretation that Kant elevates communal interaction as the solution to moral turpitude. In reality, Kant holds that solitude can afford an individual liberation from the competitive obsession with others that characterizes vice. Whereas misanthropic recluses withdraw from society out of hatred, fear, or indifference toward people, the virtuous solitary withdraws from their company in order to acquire a morally principled attitude of self-possession. By carefully delineating the development of this view in Kant’s lectures and critical works, as well as by laying out the essence of Kant’s notions of philanthropy and misanthropy, I construct an account of how solitude can perform this philanthropic function.