Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):453 - 472 (2010)

Alasdair Urquhart
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Quine has argued that modal logic began with the sin of confusing use and mention. Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand, have offered us a way out through a strategy of nominahzation. This paper reviews the history of Lewis's early work in modal logic, and then proves some results about the system in which "A is necessary" is intepreted as "A is a classical tautology."
Keywords Modal logic  Syntactical interpretations  Belnap  Anderson  Quine  Lewis  Unification algorithms
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10992-010-9135-5
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,518
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Symbolic Logic.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1932 - Dover Publications.
The Logic of Provability.George S. Boolos - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
A Survey of Symbolic Logic.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1960 - New York: Dover Publications.
Solution of a Problem of Leon Henkin.M. H. Löb - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (2):115-118.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Lewisian Semantics for S2.Edwin Mares - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (1):53-67.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
82 ( #124,066 of 2,421,926 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #545,840 of 2,421,926 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes