A dialogue model of belief

Argument and Computation 1 (1):23-46 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper offers a new model of belief by embedding the Peircean account of belief into a formal dialogue system that uses argumentation schemes for practical reasoning and abductive reasoning. A belief is characterised as a stable proposition that is derived abductively by one agent in a dialogue from the commitment set (including commitments derived from actions and goals) of another agent. On the model (to give a rough summary), a belief is defined as a proposition held by an agent that (1) is not easily changed (stable), (2) is a matter of degree (held more or less weakly or strongly), (3) guides the goals and actions of the agent, and (4) is habitually or tenaciously held in a manner that indicates a strong commitment to defend it. It is argued that the new model overcomes the pervasive conflict in artificial intelligence between the belief-desire-intention model of reasoning and the commitment model



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,931

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Construing Sen on commitment.Philip Pettit - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (1):15-32.
Acceptance and deciding to believe.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
A strongly embodied approach to machine consciousness.Owen Holland - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):97-110.


Added to PP

39 (#420,064)

6 months
5 (#707,850)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Douglas Walton
Last affiliation: University of Windsor

References found in this work

The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1-15.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.
Rationality in Action: A Symposium.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-94.
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.

View all 17 references / Add more references