Argument and Computation 1 (1):23-46 (2010)

Douglas Walton
University of Windsor
This paper offers a new model of belief by embedding the Peircean account of belief into a formal dialogue system that uses argumentation schemes for practical reasoning and abductive reasoning. A belief is characterised as a stable proposition that is derived abductively by one agent in a dialogue from the commitment set (including commitments derived from actions and goals) of another agent. On the model (to give a rough summary), a belief is defined as a proposition held by an agent that (1) is not easily changed (stable), (2) is a matter of degree (held more or less weakly or strongly), (3) guides the goals and actions of the agent, and (4) is habitually or tenaciously held in a manner that indicates a strong commitment to defend it. It is argued that the new model overcomes the pervasive conflict in artificial intelligence between the belief-desire-intention model of reasoning and the commitment model
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.1080/19462160903494576
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References found in this work BETA

The Chinese Rune Argument.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-74.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
Fallacies.C. L. Hamblin - 1970 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 160:492-492.
The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1--15.
Mathematical Models of Dialogue.C. L. Hamblin - 1971 - Theoria 37 (2):130-155.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Carneades Model of Argument Invention.Douglas N. Walton & Thomas F. Gordon - 2012 - Pragmatics and Cognition 20 (1):1-31.

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