Problems with Searle's Derivation?

Philosophia 39 (3):571-580 (2011)
Abstract
In his paper, How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is,’ John R. Searle made a valiant attempt to derive an ought-statement from purely descriptive statements. In a recent issue of Philosophia, Scott Hill has offered criticisms of that proposed derivation. I argue that Hill has not established any errors in Searle's proposed derivation
Keywords Descriptive statement  Evaluative statement  Hill, Scott  Is/Ought distinction  Searle’s derivation of “ought” from “is”
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9287-0
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References found in this work BETA
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
The "is"-"Ought" Controversy.Burleigh T. Wilkins - 1970 - Ethics 80 (2):160-164.

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