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  1. added 2020-04-16
    Moral Notions, with Three Papers on Plato.Alan Tapper, R. E. Ewin & Julius Kovesi (eds.) - 2004 - Christchurch, NZ: Cybereditions.
    Morality is often thought of as non-rational or sub-rational. In Moral Notions, first published in 1967, Julius Kovesi argues that the rationality of morality is built into the way we construct moral concepts. In showing this he also resolves the old Humean conundrum of the relation between 'facts' and 'values'. And he puts forward a method of reasoning that might make 'applied ethics' (at present largely a hodge-podge of opinions) into a constructive discipline. Kovesi's general theory of concepts - important (...)
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  2. added 2020-04-13
    No Need to Get Up From the Armchair (If You're Interested in Debunking Arguments in Metaethics).Dan Baras - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-16.
    Several authors believe that metaethicists ought to leave their comfortable armchairs and engage with serious empirical research. This paper provides partial support for the opposing view, that metaethics is rightly conducted from the armchair. It does so by focusing on debunking arguments against robust moral realism. Specifically, the article discusses arguments based on the possibility that if robust realism is correct, then our beliefs are most likely insensitive to the relevant truths. These arguments seem at first glance to be dependent (...)
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  3. added 2020-02-07
    The Biological Basis and Ideational Superstructure of Morality.Catherine Wilson - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):211-244.
    (2000). The Biological Basis and Ideational Superstructure of Morality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 30, Supplementary Volume 26: Moral Epistemology Naturalized, pp. 210-244.
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  4. added 2019-12-27
    Lei de Hume e falácia naturalista.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2016 - Anatomia Do Crime 4:187-204.
  5. added 2019-12-12
    Evolutionary Ethics.Michael Klenk - 2019 - Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics.
    This chapter first introduces naturalistic approaches to ethics more generally and distinguishes methodological ethical naturalism (the focus of this chapter), from metaphysical ethical naturalism. The second part then discusses evolutionary ethics as a specific variant of methodological ethical naturalism. After introducing the concepts of evolutionary theory that are relevant for evolutionary ethics, I will sketch the history of evolutionary ethics, which offers an interesting lesson about why it became a controversial topic, and then focus on four central questions about ethics (...)
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  6. added 2019-10-18
    Verdade e Normatividade.Ricardo Tavares Da Silva - 2017 - Anatomia Do Crime/Anatomy of Crime 2017 (6):209-232.
  7. added 2019-06-06
    Philosophy & Science: Is Ethics a Science?Massimo Pigliucci - 2006 - Philosophy Now 55:25-25.
  8. added 2019-06-06
    Gerhard Schurz, The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic.C. Pigden - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):578-579.
    Book Information The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. By Gerhard Schurz. Kluwer. Dordrecht. 1997. Pp. x + 332. £92.25.
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  9. added 2019-06-06
    A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects.David Hume & D. G. C. Macnabb (eds.) - 1738 - Collins.
    A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume's comprehensive attempt to base philosophy on a new, observationally grounded study of human nature, is one of the most important texts in Western philosophy. It is also the focal point of current attempts to understand 18th-century western philosophy. The Treatise addresses many of the most fundamental philosophical issues: causation, existence, freedom and necessity, and morality. The volume also includes Humes own abstract of the Treatise, a substantial introduction, extensive annotations, a glossary, a comprehensive (...)
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  10. added 2019-04-08
    L'etica analitica dalla legge di Hume al principio di Kant.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2004 - In Angelo Campodonico (ed.), Tra legge e virtù. La filosofia pratica angloamericana contemporanea. Genova, Italy: Il melangolo. pp. 9-46.
    I reconstruct a plot in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon ethical discussion. I discuss first the reasons why in the first half of the twentieth century the claim of a neutral character of metaethics vis-a-vis normative ethics was generally accepted; then I discuss the reasons for a U-turn that took place in 1958, which brought back to the forefront two traditional schools of normative ethics, Kantian and Utilitarian, and the reasons for criticism from the new school of virtue ethics. I conclude by (...)
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  11. added 2019-03-21
    Models of Rationality and the Psychology of Reasoning: From is to Ought, and Back.Crupi Vincenzo & Vittorio Girotto - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
    Diagnoses of rationality often arise from the experimental investigation of human reasoning. We suggest that such diagnoses can be disputed on various grounds and provide a classification. We then argue that much fruitful research done with classical experimental paradigms was triggered by normative concerns and yet fostered insight in properly psychological terms. Our examples include the selection task, the conjunction fallacy, and so-called pseudodiagnosticity. We conclude that normative considerations retain a constructive role in the psychology of reasoning, contrary to recent (...)
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  12. added 2019-03-14
    Anscombe on the Mesmeric Force of ‘Ought’ and a Spurious Kind of Moral Realism.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2017 - Etica E Politica 19 (2):51-86.
    I discuss the second of the three theses advanced by Anscombe in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The focus is the nature of entities to which – if Anscombe’s diagnosis is correct – ought and cognate modals are assumed by modern moral philosophers to refer. I reconstruct the alternative account offered by Anscombe of viable and justified ‘Aristotelian’ modals – as contrasted with mysterious and unjustified ‘Kantian’ modals; I discuss the nature and status of ‘Aristotelian necessity’ to which such legitimate modals refer (...)
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  13. added 2019-02-01
    Hobbes and the Two Faces of Ethics. [REVIEW]Sandra Leonie Field - 2018 - Online Colloquium of the European Hobbes Society 2018:1-1.
    In this review of Abizadeh's book, I question whether identifying a human 'capacity for reason' really resolves the problems with Hobbes's philosophy's distinctive combination of mechanistic materialism and moral normativity.
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  14. added 2018-08-23
    Naturalismo Moral e Normatividade: Uma investigação sobre as origens e os limites da naturalização do fenômeno moral.Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2016 - Saarbrücken, Germany: Novas Edições Acadêmicas.
    O autor propõe uma investigação do naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas como as de G. E. Moore e John Rawls. A partir da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, busca aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. O naturalismo moral é apresentado, então, numa versão (...)
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  15. added 2018-08-23
    Normatividade e Valor no Naturalismo Moral.Luca Nogueira Igansi - 2014 - Dissertation,
    Este trabalho investiga o naturalismo moral contemporâneo a partir das variadas formulações do argumento conhecido como a falácia naturalista, assim como do contraponto de algumas teorias não-naturalistas, em especial a de G. E. Moore. Parto da análise destas formulações do argumento no contexto formal da metaética contemporânea, buscando aferir a validade da falácia naturalista no contexto atual, bem como de seus limites na aplicação contra o naturalismo moral. Apresento então o naturalismo moral numa versão humeana, que sugere uma abordagem descritivista (...)
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  16. added 2018-08-23
    A Falácia Naturalista na Metaética Contemporânea: Usos e Equívocos.L. N. Igansi - 2014 - Fundamento 1 (8):11-31.
    The naturalistic fallacy according to Moore and its relation to Hume will be analyzed for an exposition both clear and updated in contemporary formal logics, which will denounce its limited scope in current metaethics. I’ll identify the origins of the expression naturalistic fallacy in Moore and atempt to refne its meaning and use, contrasting its relationship to the open-question argument and Hume’s Law. Its application is identifed in four aspects: invalidly as the openquestion argument for not establishing a metaphysical connection (...)
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  17. added 2018-08-14
    It Does Not Matter Whether We Can Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'.Alison Jaggar - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):373 - 379.
    In this paper, I want to discuss the recent attempts by Professor John R. Searle to cast doubt on the traditional empiricist distinction between fact and value. Searle's first attack on this distinction was made in 1964 in his now classic article, “How to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’.” In that paper, he presented what he claimed to be a counter-example to the thesis that statements of fact may not entail statements of value. Searle's argument aroused much controversy and inspired many (...)
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  18. added 2018-07-30
    The Naturalistic Fallacy and the History of Metaethics.Neil Sinclair - 2018 - In The Naturalistic Fallacy. Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter -- the first in the edited collection "The Naturalistic Fallacy" (Cambridge University Press 2019) -- locates the naturalistic fallacy within the context of the other claims Moore defends in Principia Ethica. I explore the notions of “definition” and “analysis” as Moore understood them and set out in detail the multiple interpretations of the fallacy and open question argument. I then take a broad view of the influence of the fallacy on the Century of metaethics that came after Moore, (...)
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  19. added 2018-06-03
    The Autonomy of Ethics.Barry Maguire - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 431-442.
    This chapter discusses the prospects for logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic characterisations of the autonomy of ethics.
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  20. added 2018-04-09
    The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency.William Andrew Rottschaefer - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    This important book brings findings and theories in biology and psychology to bear on the fundamental question in ethics of what it means to behave morally. It explains how we acquire and put to work our capacities to act morally and how these capacities are reliable means to achieving true moral beliefs, proper moral motivations, and successful moral actions. By presenting a complete model of moral agency based on contemporary evolutionary theory, developmental biology and psychology, and social cognitive theory, the (...)
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  21. added 2018-03-22
    The Evolutionary Manifesto.John E. Stewart - manuscript
    The Evolutionary Manifesto shows that evolution is directional and demonstrates that this has major implications for humanity. The Manifesto shows that humanity must align its social systems and behaviour with the trajectory of evolution if we are to survive and thrive into the future. The Manifesto goes on to demonstrate that humanity has an essential role to play in the future evolution of life on this planet. It demonstrates that life on Earth has reached a critical stage in evolution’s trajectory. (...)
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  22. added 2017-10-12
    Wat is menselijk? Wat is wenselijk?Pouwel Slurink - 2006 - Krisis 7 (1):26-41.
    Relatively short Dutch introduction to an evolutionary approach to morality. A synthesis is given of various models of moral evolution. Some remarks are made on a way to look at the evolution of a compatibilistic 'free will' and a model is given of a way in which the 'good' can be understood as the results of shared interests (which, of course, gives an incomplete model, but at the same time throws a lot of light on the way in which we (...)
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  23. added 2017-01-24
    A 'Sensible Knave'? Hume, Jane Austen and Mr Elliot.Charles R. Pigden - 2012 - Intellectual History Review 22 (3):465-480.
    This paper deals with what I take to be one woman’s literary response to a philosophical problem. The woman is Jane Austen, the problem is the rationality of Hume’s ‘sensible knave’, and Austen’s response is to deepen the problem. Despite his enthusiasm for virtue, Hume reluctantly concedes in the EPM that injustice can be a rational strategy for ‘sensible knaves’, intelligent but selfish agents who feel no aversion towards thoughts of villainy or baseness. Austen agrees, but adds that ABSENT CONSIDERATIONS (...)
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  24. added 2016-12-28
    Fact/Value Holism, Feminist Philosophy, and Nazi Cancer Research.Sharyn Clough - 2015 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-12.
    Fact/value holism has become commonplace in philosophy of science, especially in feminist literature. However, that facts are bearers of empirical content, while values are not, remains a firmly-held distinction. I support a more thorough-going holism: both facts and values can function as empirical claims, related in a seamless, semantic web. I address a counterexample from Kourany where facts and values seem importantly discontinuous, namely, the simultaneous support by the Nazis of scientifically sound cancer research and morally unsound political policies. I (...)
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  25. added 2016-12-12
    Two Puzzles in Metaethics.Susana Nuccetelli - 2010 - Journal of Theoretical and Applied Ethics 1 (1):15-16.
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  26. added 2016-12-08
    More Bad News for the Logical Autonomy of Ethics.Mark T. Nelson - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):203-216.
    Are there good arguments from Is to Ought? Toomas Karmo has claimed that there are trivially valid arguments from Is to Ought, but no sound ones. I call into question some key elements of Karmo’s argument for the “logical autonomy of ethics”, and show that attempts to use it as part of an overall case for moral skepticism would be self-defeating.
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  27. added 2016-12-08
    Practical Inference and the is/Ought Question.Govert Den Hartogh - 1980 - Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (2):129-147.
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  28. added 2016-12-05
    On the Possibility of Deducing What Ought to Be From What Is.Carl Jørgensen - 1955 - Ethics 66 (4):271-278.
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  29. added 2016-10-31
    The Is-Ought Problem Stems From Morality as a Simplifying Framework.Uri Harris - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that David Hume's is-ought problem stems from morality as a simplifying framework. Morality is the attempt to describe human behaviour and its relation to nature through a court framework, dating to prehistoric times. Such a court does not really exist, hence we are not referring to anything directly when we make moral statements, and therefore 'is' and 'ought' do not align. The solution is to replace morality with what it's really trying to describe: patterns in (...)
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  30. added 2016-08-17
    Review: Reviews. [REVIEW]Antony Duff - 1982 - Philosophy 57 (222):562 - 563.
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  31. added 2016-01-11
    Sentimentalism, Blameworthiness, and Wrongdoing.Antti Kauppinen - 2017 - In Karsten Stueber & Remy Debes (eds.), Ethical Sentimentalism. Cambridge University Press.
    For ambitious metaphysical neo-sentimentalists, all normative facts are grounded in fitting attitudes, where fittingness is understood in naturalistic terms. In this paper, I offer a neo-sentimentalist account of blameworthiness in terms of the reactive attitudes of a morally authoritative subject I label a Nagelian Imp. I also argue that moral impermissibility is indirectly linked to blameworthiness: roughly, an act is morally impermissible if and only if and because it is not *possible* in the circumstances to adopt a plan of performing (...)
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  32. added 2015-10-13
    Two Versions of Hume's Law.Campbell Brown - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):2-7.
    Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as (...)
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  33. added 2015-10-05
    When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law.Govind Persad - 2014 - Law and Ineq 32:31.
    Recent work in the behavioral sciences asserts that we are subject to a variety of cognitive biases. For example, we mourn losses more than we prize equivalently sized gains; we are more inclined to believe something if it matches our previous beliefs; and we even relate more warmly or coldly to others depending on whether the coffee cup we are holding is warm or cold. Drawing on this work, case law and legal scholarship have asserted that we have reason to (...)
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  34. added 2015-09-07
    Is ‘Ought’ an Object? Meinong’s and Veber’s Answers.Venanzio Raspa - 2012 - In T. Pirc (ed.), Object, Person, and Reality: An Introduction to France Veber. JSKD. pp. 53-65.
    Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is (...)
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  35. added 2015-09-06
    Sollen: il dover essere è un oggetto?: le riposte di Meinong e Veber.Venanzio Raspa - 2012 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 89 (2):239-262.
    Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is (...)
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  36. added 2015-08-31
    Deus Ex Machina: A Cautionary Tale for Naturalists.Cailin O'Connor, Nathan Fulton, Elliott Wagner & P. Kyle Stanford - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):51-62.
    In this paper we critically examine and seek to extend Philip Kitcher’s Ethical Project to weave together a distinctive naturalistic conception of how ethics came to occupy the place it does in our lives and how the existing ethical project should be revised and extended into the future. Although we endorse his insight that ethical progress is better conceived of as the improvement of an existing state than an incremental approach towards a fixed endpoint, we nonetheless go on to argue (...)
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  37. added 2015-07-27
    Mind the Is-Ought Gap.Daniel J. Singer - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (4):193-210.
    The is-ought gap is Hume’s claim that we can’t get an ‘ought’ from just ‘is’s. Prior (“The Autonomy of Ethics,” 1960) showed that its most straightforward formulation, a staple of introductory philosophy classes, fails. Many authors attempt to resurrect the claim by restricting its domain syntactically or by reformulating it in terms of models of deontic logic. Those attempts prove to be complex, incomplete, or incorrect. I provide a simple reformulation of the is-ought gap that closely fits Hume’s description of (...)
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  38. added 2015-06-11
    Reconstruction in Moral Philosophy?Matthew Braddock & Alexander Rosenberg - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (1):63-80.
    We raise three issues for Philip Kitcher's "Ethical Project" (2011): First, we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them, which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive normative conclusions from positive ones--'ought' from 'is'. Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's metaethical (...)
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  39. added 2015-03-08
    How To Be a Moral Platonist.Knut Olav Skarsune - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics (10).
    Contrary to popular opinion, non-natural realism can explain both why normative properties supervene on descriptive properties, and why this pattern is analytic. The explanation proceeds by positing a subtle polysemy in normative predicates like “good”. Such predicates express slightly different senses when they are applied to particulars (like Florence Nightingale) and to kinds (like altruism). The former sense, “goodPAR”, can be defined in terms of the latter, “goodKIN”, as follows: x is goodPAR iff there is a kind K such that (...)
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  40. added 2015-03-01
    Darwinian Normative Skepticism.Dustin Locke - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.
    Sharon Street (2006) has argued that, given certain plausible evolutionary considerations, normative realism leads to normative skepticism. Street calls this ‘the Darwinian dilemma’. This paper considers the two most popular responses to the Darwinian dilemma and argues that both are problematic. According to the naturalist response, the evolutionary account of our normative dispositions reveals that there was selection for normative dispositions that were reliable with respect to normative truth. According to the minimalist response, the evolutionary account reveals that there was (...)
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  41. added 2014-10-24
    Faith and Goodness: A Reply to Hocutt.J. E. R. Staddon - 2009 - Behavior and Philosophy 37:181 - 185.
    Professor Hocutt and I agree that David Hume first pointed out that "ought"—what should be done—cannot be derived from "is"—what is the case. Hocutt goes on to claim that "ought," in fact, derives from factual observation of "what we care about," which amounts to saying "you should do what you want to do." This seems to me unsatisfactory as moral philosophy.
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  42. added 2014-10-22
    Hume's 'Ought' and 'Is' Statement: A Radical Behaviorist's Perspective.E. A. Vargas - 1982 - Behaviorism 7 (1):1-23.
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  43. added 2014-07-07
    How Not to Be a Metaethical Naturalist –Jesse Prinz on the Emotional Construction of Morals.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):145-154.
    Jesse Prinz develops a naturalistic metaethical theory with which he purports to sidestep ‘Hume's law’ by demonstrating how, on his theory, in describing what our moral beliefs commit us to we can determine what our moral obligations are. I aim to show that Prinz does not deliver on his prescriptive promise – he does not bridge the is–ought gap in any meaningful way. Given that Prinz goes on to argue that (1) his moral psychology highlights fundamental shortcomings in ‘traditional’ normative (...)
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  44. added 2014-06-11
    Hume’s Law Violated?Rik Peels - 2014 - Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):449-455.
    Introduction: Prinz’s SentimentalismMany ethicists claim that one cannot derive an ought from an is. In others words, they think that one cannot derive a statement that has prescriptive force from purely descriptive statements. This thesis plays a crucial role in many theoretical and practical ethical arguments. Since, according to many, David Hume advocated a view along these lines, this thesis has been called ‘Hume’s Law’. In this paper, I adopt this widespread terminology, whether or not Hume did indeed take this (...)
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  45. added 2014-04-03
    Ecocentrism and Appeals to Nature's Goodness: Must They Be Fallacious?Antoine C. Dussault - manuscript
  46. added 2014-04-03
    L’écocentrisme et ses appels normatifs à la nature : sont-ils nécessairement fallacieux ?Antoine C. Dussault - 2013 - In É Litalien (ed.), Peut-on tirer une éthique de l'étude de la nature ? Les Cahiers d'Ithaque. pp. 43-76.
  47. added 2014-04-03
    Le rôle de la science dans l'écocentrisme humien de Callicott.Antoine C. Dussault - 2010 - Revue Phares 10:103-123.
    Dans cet article, je présenterai la stratégie adoptée par J. B. Callicott pour ancrer l’écocentrisme dans les sciences biologiques et écologiques tout en restant en accord avec la méta-éthique humienne selon laquelle on ne peut directement inférer un jugement portant sur le devoir-être à partir d'un jugement portant sur l'être. Je le ferai en rappelant d’abord quelques caractéristiques importantes de la méta-éthique humienne quant à la relation entre la raison, les émotions et les jugements de valeur. Je montrerai ensuite comment (...)
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  48. added 2014-04-03
    Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
    My first paper on the Is/Ought issue. The young Arthur Prior endorsed the Autonomy of Ethics, in the form of Hume’s No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) but the later Prior developed a seemingly devastating counter-argument. I defend Prior's earlier logical thesis (albeit in a modified form) against his later self. However it is important to distinguish between three versions of the Autonomy of Ethics: Ontological, Semantic and Ontological. Ontological Autonomy is the thesis that moral judgments, to be true, must answer to a realm (...)
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  49. added 2014-04-02
    Minding the Is-Ought Gap.Campbell Brown - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69.
    The ‘No Ought From Is’ principle (or ‘NOFI’) states that a valid argument cannot have both an ethical conclusion and non-ethical premises. Arthur Prior proposed several well-known counterexamples, including the following: Tea-drinking is common in England; therefore, either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot. My aim in this paper is to defend NOFI against Prior’s counterexamples. I propose two novel interpretations of NOFI and prove that both are true.
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  50. added 2014-04-02
    Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):323-352.
    Examining the moral sense theories of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith from the perspective of the is-ought problem, this essay shows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals. According to one interpretation, Hume's or Smith's theory is just a description of human nature. In this case, it does not answer the question of how we ought to live. According to another interpretation, it has some normative implications. In this case, it (...)
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