Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):142-147 (2011)

Authors
Lori Watson
University of San Diego
Abstract
I present two challenges to the theory of moral sentimentalism that Michael Slote defends in his book. The first challenge aims to show that there are cases in which we empathize with an agent and yet judge her actions to be morally wrong. If such cases are plausible, then we have good reason to doubt Slote's claim that moral judgments are an affective attitude of warmth or chill and, thus, are purely sentiments. The second challenge is more of a suggestion. At the end of my paper, I suggest that perhaps one important role that empathy plays in our moral phenomenology is to mitigate the scope of our moral judgments. If this is right, it tells not only against Slote's account but against moral sentimentalist approaches more broadly.
Keywords empathy
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00063.x
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Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):3-14.

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