Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20 (1975)
In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action.
|Keywords||Action Compatibilism Determinism Freedom Intention Philosophical Anthropology Valuation Frankfurt, H|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Treating Patients as Persons: A Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-Centered Care.Vikki A. Entwistle & Ian S. Watt - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (8):29-39.
Similar books and articles
The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Hugh J. McCann - 1998 - Cornell University Press.
Is Hard Determinism a Form of Compatibilism?Jeremy Randel Koons - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
The Freedom of Collective Agents.Frank Hindriks - 2008 - Journal of Political Philosophy 16 (2):165–183.
What is the Problem of Freedom of the Will?Paweł Łuków - 2007 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):65-80.
Freedom and the Human Sciences: Hume’s Science of Man Versus Kant’s Pragmatic Anthropology.Thomas Sturm - 2011 - Kant Yearbook 3 (1):23-42.
Locke on the Freedom of the Will.Vere Chappell - 1994 - In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press. pp. 101--21.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads864 ( #968 of 2,168,627 )
Recent downloads (6 months)34 ( #8,474 of 2,168,627 )
How can I increase my downloads?