Free agency

Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20 (1975)
Abstract
In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action.
Keywords Action  Compatibilism  Determinism  Freedom  Intention  Philosophical Anthropology  Valuation  Frankfurt, H
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X  
DOI 10.2307/2024703
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
The Scope of Instrumental Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.

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