Free agency

Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20 (1975)
Authors
Gary Watson
University of Southern California
Abstract
In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action.
Keywords Action  Compatibilism  Determinism  Freedom  Intention  Philosophical Anthropology  Valuation  Frankfurt, H
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0022-362X  
DOI 10.2307/2024703
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 36,596
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.
Agency and Inner Freedom.Michael Garnett - 2017 - Noûs 51 (1):3-23.
Doxastic Freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.

View all 169 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
1,108 ( #1,335 of 2,303,818 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
105 ( #2,978 of 2,303,818 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature