26 found
Order:
See also
Robert Allen
Wayne State University
  1.  25
    The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective.Robert C. Allen - 2011 - In Proceedings of the British Academy Volume 167, 2009 Lectures. pp. 199.
    This chapter presents the text of a lecture on the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain given at the British Academy's 2009 Keynes Lecture in Economics. This text suggests that the Industrial Revolution was Britain's response to the global economy that emerged after 1500 and that Britain's success in world trade resulted in one of the most urbanised economies in Europe with unusually high wages and cheap energy prices. The text here also highlights the contribution of Britain in the invention of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  2. Free Will and Indeterminism: Robert Kane's Libertarianism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3.  46
    Free Will and Indeterminism.Robert Francis Allen - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355.
    Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons. That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop values and beliefs besides those that presently make up her motives, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. An agent wills freely, on this view, by beingultimately responsible (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  4. St. Augustine’s Free Will Theodicy and Natural Evil.Robert Allen - 2003 - Ars Disputandi 3.
    The problem of evil is an obstacle to justified belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God . According to Saint Augustine’s free will theodicy , moral evil attends free will. Might something like AFWT also be used to account for natural evil? After all, it is possible that calamities such as famines, earthquakes, and floods are the effects of the sinful willing of certain persons, viz., ‘fallen angels.’ Working to destroy our faith, Satan and his cohorts could be responsible (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. The Mereology of Events.Robert Allen - 2005 - Sorites 16:23-37.
    I demonstrate here that it is possible for an event to be identical with one of its proper parts, refuting the key premise in Lawrence Lombard's argument for the essentiality of an event's time. I also propose and defend an alternative to his criterion of event identity.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Free Agency and Self-Esteem.Robert Allen - 2008 - Sorites 20:74-79.
    In this paper I define the role of self-esteem in promoting free agency, in order to meet some objections to the content-neutrality espoused by the reflective acceptance approach to free agency, according to which an agent has acted freely if and only if she would reflectively accept the process by which her motive was formed -- in other words, any volition the agent forms is an impetus to a free action just in case she would positively appraise its genesis. For (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Syntactical Learning and Judgment, Still Unconscious and Still Abstract: Comment on Dulany, Carlson, and Dewey.Arthur S. Reber, Robert F. Allen & S. Regan - 1985 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 114:17-24.
  8. Identity and Becoming.Robert Allen - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):527-548.
    A material object is constituted by a sum of parts all of which are essential to the sum but some of which seem inessential to the object itself. Such object/sum of parts pairs include my body/its torso and appendages and my desk/its top, drawers, and legs. In these instances, we are dealing with objects and their components. But, fundamentally, we may also speak, as Locke does, of an object and its constitutive matter—a “mass of particles”—or even of that aggregate and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Absolutism Vs. Relativism in Contemporary Ontology.Robert F. Allen - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:343-352.
    In this paper, I examine Emest Sosa’s defense of Conceptual Relativism: the view that what exists is a function of human thought. My examination reveals that his defense entails an ontology that is indistinguishable from that of the altemative he labels less “sensible,” viz., Absolutism: the view that reality exists independently of our thinking. I conclude by defending Absolutism against Sosa’s objections.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  71
    Responsibility and Motivation.Robert F. Allen - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):289-299.
  11. The Subject is Qualia: Paronyms and Temporary Identity.Robert F. Allen - manuscript
  12. Agent Causation and Ultimate Responsibility.Robert F. Allen - manuscript
    Positions taken in the current debate over free will can be seen as responses to the following conditional: If every action is caused solely by another event and a cause necessitates its effect, then there is no action to which there is an alternative. The Libertarian, who believes that alternatives are a requirement of free will, responds by denying the right conjunct of C’s antecedent, maintaining that some actions are caused, either mediately or immediately, by events whose effects could be (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  66
    Robust Alternatives and Responsibility.Robert Allen - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):21-29.
    The Principle of Robust Alternatives states that an agent is responsible for doing something only if he/she could have performed a ‘robust’ alternative: another action having a different moral or practical value. Defenders of PRA maintain that it is not refuted by a ‘Frankfurt case’, given that its agent can be seen as having had such an alternative provided that we properly qualify that for which she is responsible. I argue here against two versions of this defense. First, I show (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14.  4
    Psychology and the Economics of Invention.Robert C. Allen - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Invention is an investment in which the costs of the Research and Development project balance future returns. Those returns depend on objective factors like wage and capital costs but also on subjective factors because they are future projections. The more optimistic the inventor, the higher are the projected returns. Baumard uses Life History Theory to relate optimism to the affluence of inventors and their societies.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  35
    Self-Forming Actions: The Genesis of a Free Will.Robert Allen - 2007 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:263-278.
    The following is a now popular argument for free will skepticism:1. If free will exists, then people make themselves.2. People do not make themselves.3. Thus, free will does not exist.It would make no sense to hold someone responsible, either for what he’s like or what he’s done, unless he has made himself. But no one makes himself. A person’s character is imposed upon him by Nature and others. To rebut, I intend to lean on common usage, according to which 2 (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  61
    Re-Examining Frankfurt Cases.Robert Allen - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):363-376.
  17.  57
    Self-Forming Actions.Robert Allen - 2007 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:263-278.
    The following is a now popular argument for free will skepticism:1. If free will exists, then people make themselves.2. People do not make themselves.3. Thus, free will does not exist.It would make no sense to hold someone responsible, either for what he’s like or what he’s done, unless he has made himself. But no one makes himself. A person’s character is imposed upon him by Nature and others. To rebut, I intend to lean on common usage, according to which 2 (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  2
    Absolutism Vs. Relativism in Contemporary Ontology.Robert F. Allen - 1998 - Journal of Philosophical Research 23:343-352.
    In this paper, I examine Emest Sosa’s defense of Conceptual Relativism: the view that what exists is a function of human thought. My examination reveals that his defense entails an ontology that is indistinguishable from that of the altemative he labels less “sensible,” viz., Absolutism: the view that reality exists independently of our thinking. I conclude by defending Absolutism against Sosa’s objections.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Individual Differences in Implicit Learning: Implications for the Evolution of Consciousness.Arthur S. Reber & Robert F. Allen - 2000 - In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamin.
  20. Free Will and Evaluation: Remarks on Noel Hendrickson's "Free Will Nihilism and the Question of Method".Robert F. Allen - manuscript
    Noel Hendrickson believes that free will is separable from the “evaluative intuitions” with which it has been traditionally associated. But what are these intuitions? Answer: principles such as PAP, Β, and UR (6). The thesis that free will is separable from these principles, however, is hardly unique, as they are also eschewed by compatibilists who are unwilling to abdicate altogether evaluative intuitions. We are told in addition that there are “metaphysical senses” of free will that are not “relevant to responsibility” (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  9
    Freedom, Will, and Nature.Robert Allen - 2007 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81:263-278.
  22.  10
    Beyond Hegel's Ontological Claim.Robert Van Roden Allen - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (2):305-314.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  3
    Emancipation and Subjectivity: A Projected Kant-Habermas Confrontation.Robert Allen - 1982 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 9 (3-4):281-303.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Rawlsian Affirmative Action.Robert Allen - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 42:1-8.
    In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history suggests that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. The Subject is Qualia.Robert F. Allen - manuscript
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Honoring Sergeant Carter.Allene G. Carter & Robert L. Allen - 2004 - Science and Society 68 (3):377-378.