Philosophical Studies 92 (3):307-319 (1998)

Ruth Weintraub
Tel Aviv University
Comparisons between utilities pose a pressing problem if, while incapable of being grounded, they are required in ethical deliberation. My aim is to consider whether there are epistemological impediments to implementing such ethical choices. Can we find ourselves being persuaded of the ethical need to compare utilities of different individuals, yet unable to do so because the comparisons cannot be warranted? I argue that the problem cannot arise; no plausible moral principle will invoke magnitudes which are inscrutable.
Keywords utilities  comparisons
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004203702557
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
On Economic Inequality.Amartya Sen - 1997 - Clarendon Press.

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Transcendental Arguments and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons.Mauro Rossi - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):273-295.

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