Abstract

The dissertation examines Aristotle's method in his three great treatises on biology--the History of Animals, the Parts of Animals, and the Generation of Animals. It argues that these works exhibit a dialectical method, based on the techniques and methods developed in Aristotle's Topics. In particular, Aristotle applies a dialectical method to the difficult task of justifying the principles of biology. ;Finding a dialectical method in the biology suggests a new solution to a well-known conflict between Aristotle's theory of science and his scientific practice. His Posterior Analytics pictures a science as a body of necessarily true propositions joined by syllogistic deductions, and implies that scientific method would be rigidly formal and demonstrative. But the biology follows a different course, it seems, for it contains no demonstrations, studies the perishable and changing, and is guided by a far more inductive method of procedure. But if there is a portion of Aristotle's full theory of science to which the biology does adhere, then the tension can be considerably eased. ;The dissertation is in two parts. Part One centers on the theory of science, and a special problem arising from it, which I have called the problem of classification. Chapter I argues that the theory of science requires classification of a definite character. Chapter II claims that the works on biology fail to classify in this way. Chapter III argues that dialectic is a crucial component of the theory, able to seek out and test scientific principles, and thus provides a new avenue into Aristotle's method in biology. ;Part Two explores the use of dialectic in the biology. Chapter IV of the dissertation argues that, in a variety of important ways, the Generation of Animals operates dialectically. Chapter V extends this analysis to the Parts of Animals, and Chapter VI does the same for the History of Animals. A concluding chapter summarizes my argument and takes a final look at the tension between theory and practice