Assertion, denial and some cancellation rules in modal logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (3):299--318 (1988)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but the original publication is available at springerlink.com . N.B. Timothy Williamson is now based at the Philosophy Faculty, University of Oxford

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Converse relations.Timothy Williamson - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (2):249-262.
Non-genuine MacIntosh logics.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):87 - 101.
Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
Knowledge of Counterfactuals.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:45-64.
Williamson on Modality.Juhani Yli-Vakkuri & Mark McCullagh - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-851.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
87 (#199,728)

6 months
5 (#710,385)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references