20 found
Order:
See also
Anandi Hattiangadi
Stockholm University
  1. Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
    N.B. Dr Bykvist is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page.
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   92 citations  
  2. Oughts and Thoughts: Rule-Following and the Normativity of Content.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    In Oughts and Thoughts, Anandi Hattiangadi provides an innovative response to the argument for meaning skepticism set out by Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  3. Is Meaning Normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
    Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it merely determines which pattern (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  4.  51
    Assessment Sensitivity About Future Contingents, Vindication and Self-Refutation.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - manuscript
    John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism – Assessment Sensitivity – provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: statements about the future that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and solves the puzzle, Assessment Sensitivity is ultimately self-refuting.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  87
    Moral Supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.
    It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Making It Implicit: Brandom on Rule Following.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):419-431.
    In Making it Explicit, Brandom aims to articulate an account of conceptual content that accommodates its normati vity-a requirement on theories of content that Brandom traces to Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations. It is widely held that the normativity requirement cannot be met, or at least not with ease, because theories of content face an intractable dilemma. Brandom proposes to evade the dilemma by adopting a middle road---one that uses normative vocabulary, but treats norms as implicit in practices. I argue that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  7.  14
    Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem.Anandi Hattiangadi - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Some More Thoughts on Semantic Oughts: A Reply to Daniel Whiting.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):54-63.
    1. IntroductionA considerable number of philosophers maintain that meaning is intrinsically normative. In this journal, Daniel Whiting has defended the normativity of meaning against some of my recent objections . 1 This paper responds to Whiting's arguments.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  9.  67
    Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem.Anandi Hattiangadi - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.
    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11.  64
    In Defence of Narrow Content.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):539-550.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  96
    The Love of Truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
    It is frequently said that belief aims at truth, in an explicitly normative sense—that is, that one ought to believe the proposition that p if, and only if, p is true. This truth norm is frequently invoked to explain why we should seek evidential justification in our beliefs, or why we should try to be rational in our belief formation—it is because we ought to believe the truth that we ought to follow the evidence in belief revision. In this paper, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  13.  9
    Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument: Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (6):697-706.
    In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer’s objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer’s objections to primitivism can be met.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  56
    The Normativity of Meaning and the Hard Problem of Intentionality.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):742-754.
    This note addresses two of Gibbard's central contentions in Meaning and Normativity: first, that the concept of meaning is normative, and second, that an expressivist account of semantic concepts and statements can shed light on the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining intentionality in naturalistic terms.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  22
    No, One Should Not Believe All Truths.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1091-1103.
    ABSTRACTIn a recent paper, Alexander Greenberg defends a truth norm of belief according to which if one has some doxastic attitude towards p, one ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. He responds, in particular, to the ‘blindspot’ objection to truth norms such as da: in the face of true blindspots, such as it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining, truth norms such as da are unsatisfiable; they entail that one ought to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  81
    The Rules of ThoughtBy Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):393-397.
    The Rules of Thought, by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis, is a dense and ambitious book whose principal aim is to defend the view that philosophical inquiry is a priori inquiry into essential natures. The book covers a broad range of philosophical issues spanning the philosophy of mind and language, the epistemology of metaphysical modality and the philosophy of philosophy. It will be of considerable interest to many, since there is something in it for just about everyone. That said, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Semantic Normativity in Context.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2009 - In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  18.  5
    The Limits of Expressivism.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 224-242.
    In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that meta-ethical expressivism can be profitably extended to semantic and intentional language: meta-linguistic discourse about meaning, reference, content, and the like. This chapter argues that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense selfundermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; and it undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  11
    Credibility@Feminist.Epistemology.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (4):647-657.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.