Abstract

Aristotle’s distinction between phronesis (practical wisdom) and episteme (theory) has been centrally influential in the development of hermeneutics. Heidegger, initiating hermeneutic phenomenology, foregrounded practical understanding as foundational (or ‘ready-to-hand’): scientific theory was but secondary (‘presented-at-hand’). Gadamer subsequently emphasised understanding as primarily practical, as an applicative achievement, within broad assumptions, ‘horizons of understanding’, a metaphor signalling explicitly/implicitly represented surroundings. How should Aristotle’s idea of practical wisdom in human affairs articulated in phenomenology’s hermeneutic thought - principally Gadamer’s scholarship - inform researcher analyses? Here an account of hermeneutic philosophy, with its core conceptual formations, is presented as concerning situated understanding in practice, phronesis. Multiple instances of this behavioural research focus from psychology’s Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis then receive reflection. Interviewing proceeds from ‘horizons of expectation’ (Jauss 1982). Themes are viewed as 'horizons of understanding’ (Gadamer 1975), interviewees’ perspectives on practices. A researcher may engage in resolving ‘indeterminacy’ (Iser 1978). Participants’ reflectively recounted meaning-making phronesis practices can be structured in their analyses by locating their a priori, universally discernible aspects. Thus phronesis is constituted by generic, care (Heidegger’s Sorge) embodying activity, ‘emplaced’ or understood from tacit representational affective ‘horizons of understanding’: participant bodies can become denoted ‘equipment’ (Heidegger’s Zeug). Keywords: caring, hermeneutic phronesis, interpretative horizons of understanding, phenomenology