Abstract
SummaryReferring to my previous publications on the European philosophy of science , this paper presents my views, as a historian of epistemology, concerning the scope of a certain programme of research into the development of the philosophy of science and reception of some of its conceptions, against limitations of Anglo‐Saxon historiographic perception. Calling for a revaluation of various marginalized conceptions I oppose the hitherto dominating interpretations of epistemological novelty of Popper's conception and present my own approaches to Gonseth, Bachelard, Enriques, Brunschvicg and Piaget. I oppose also the predominant and false picture of the 1920s and 1930s in the European philosophy of science based on the exceptional authority and validity of the Vienna Circle climate. 1 apply the views of M. Foucault and J. Der‐rida to demonstrate the significance of studies on the cases from the margin of the history of epistemological evolution. The basic point is that some post‐neopositivistic achievements in epistemology were chronologically prior to the internal evolution of neopositivism under Popperian influence