What is wrong with the manifestability argument for supervenience

Abstract

The manifestability argument presented by Papineau and Loewer turns on the premise that nonphysical properties are capable of making a difference to physical conditions. From this and the completeness of physics a strenuous supervenience conclusion is supposed to follow. I argue that the plausible version of this premise implies a weaker supervenience thesis only, one that is too weak to be of any use for a physicalist. There is a more contentious premise one might use to deduce the needed conclusion, but that more contentious premise has no empirical support

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2009-01-28

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D. Gene Witmer
University of Florida

References found in this work

The Character of Mind.Colin McGinn - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Why Supervenience?David Papineau - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):66.
An Argument for Strong Supervenience.Barry M. Loewer - 1995 - In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press. pp. 218--225.

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Citations of this work

Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.

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