Ian Proops: Kant on Transcendental Freedom ( The Fiery Test of Critique: Chs. 11–12)

Kantian Review:1-8 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Kant’s position on the problem of free will can be perplexing and frustrating: all the real questions about human agential capacities or even about issues of moral imputability are empirical questions, which have empirical answers. But there remains a metaphysical or transcendental problem about the possibility of freedom, which is forever insoluble. Ian Proops’ discussion in The Fiery Test of Critique is to be commended for displaying the rare virtue of appreciating this last point and presenting Kant’s position about it accurately. The only questionable part has to do with the standard terminology – ‘determinism’, ‘libertarianism’, ‘compatibilism’, and ‘incompatibilism’. I argue that it would be better to say, as Kant does, and Proops also does most of the time, that practical freedom, hence transcendental freedom, must be presupposed whenever we act or even judge, but how freedom is possible is both unknowable and even incomprehensible to us.

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The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic.Ian Proops - 2021 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Kant's Gesammelte Schriften.[author unknown] - 1913 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 76:670-670.
Kant. [REVIEW]Allen Wood - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (4):323-325.

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