Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330 (2007)
AbstractThis paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the 'sense of understanding' that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a necessary condition, and work by J.D. Trout that exploits psychological research on the hindsight and overconfidence biases is used to show that it is not a sufficient condition. It is argued, however, that certain intellectual and moral concerns give us good reason to still try to meet the hard problem's explanatory challenge, despite its extrascientific nature.
Similar books and articles
Erratum: Explanation and the Hard Problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):467 -.
I Can't Get No (Epistemic) Satisfaction: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness Entails a Hard Problem of Explanation.Brian D. Earp - 2012 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.
Rule-Following and Consciousness: Old Problem or New?Alexander Miller & Ali Saboohi - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (2):171-178.
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?Tom McClelland - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):17-30.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Progressivism of Scientific Explanation.John Park - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
Origins of the Qualitative Aspects of Consciousness: Evolutionary Answers to Chalmers' Hard Problem.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2013 - In Liz Swan (ed.), Origins of Mind. Springer. pp. 259--269.
On a Confusion About Which Intuitions to Trust: From the Hard Problem to a Not Easy One.Miguel Sebastián - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):31-40.
Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2020 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 265-289.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Thoughts on the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness.Stan Klein - 2021 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 8 (74-80).
Are Sensations Still Brain Processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Michal Polák & Tomáš Marvan - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
References found in this work
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - New York: The Free Press.
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.