Abstract

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the ideas in the context of the conception of reason in terms of formal logic according to which it is the faculty of inferring mediately. By this, the impression widespread in secondary literature arises that the pure concepts of reason according to Kant have a syllogistic sense, i. e. are either based on syllogisms or stand otherwise in relation with them. This paper argues instead: that Kant derives the ideas – similar to the pure concepts of understanding – by means of a metaphysical deduction from the functions of all thinking in the so-called table of judgements; that accordingly – as the categories – they demand a consequent judgement-theoretical explanation; yet, that here the thinking functions that fall under the title of relation find a different employment; and that therefore the judgements which result from this possess the status of final principles for human experience wherein the conception of reason in terms of transcendental logic consists.