The controversy over short selling has continued unabated from the introduction of modern equity trading in Amsterdam in 1610 to the present day. Nevertheless, the business ethics literature has not really addressed short selling. Short sellers not only profit from the misery of others, they also create it through their selling activities. However, they also provide a socially useful service by making prices better reflect true values, protecting other investors from purchasing overpriced securities. Short sellers can also help to provide (...) liquidity in the markets. Recently, there has been a hue and cry against so called "naked" short selling, which involves not delivering the shares that have been sold. This gives manipulators a tool for depressing stock prices and deprives purchasers of voting rights and potential stock lending revenue. Naked short selling creates ethical issues for short sellers, buyers, brokers, market makers, and regulators. Is it ethical to exploit a legal loophole that permits sellers to sell stock and delay delivering shares indefinitely? (shrink)

What are the ethical obligations of the sellers of financial products to their customers? Stockbrokers in the U.S. have a legal and ethical requirement to recommend only “suitable” investments to their customers. This is a fairly weak standard. Currently, there are proposals to raise the standard to a fiduciary one in which the recommendations would have to be in the best interests of the clients. Brokers sell solutions to financial problems. Similar to an auto mechanic or a doctor, the product (...) often consists of both the professional advice and its implementation. There are numerous conflicts of interest between brokerage firms and their customers in that the products that pay the highest commissions may not be the best ones for the customers. The societal perspective adds complications, however. Society depends on modern financial markets to raise capital for productive enterprises and to spread risk. Issuers of financial products need distribution channels for their products just like the producers of any other products. Commissions create powerful incentives for the distribution channels, but at the same time produce conflicts of interest—a type of ethical pollution. Just as our society tolerates some pollution as a byproduct of other useful activities, it may be useful to tolerate some of these financial conflicts of interest. The nature of the relationship should govern the ethical standard. Those selling advice, regardless of how they label themselves, should adhere to a best-interest fiduciary standard. More limited relationships should be limited to the mandate involved in the relationship. (shrink)

In response to Morningstar’s release of carbon risk (CR) scores in May 2018, (environmentally) sustainable mutual funds in the U.S. showed a greater reduction in their portfolio CR relative to conventional funds. The observed causal impact of this third-party disclosure is consistent with the funds’ primary investment objectives. Differences in fund names, potentially driven by marketing considerations, appear irrelevant to the behavior of sustainable funds. Conventional funds that are signatories to the UN’s Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) or those with (...) secondary sustainability mandates behave more like other conventional funds rather than sustainable funds. These funds appear relatively insensitive to disclosures as their sustainability considerations are superseded by other primary investment criteria. Fiduciary and legal bonding influences fund managers’ response to sustainability disclosures. Sustainable funds lower their CR score by reducing exposure to fossil fuels, not by increasing exposure to renewables. (shrink)